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I. INTRODUCrION
State by state, the legal prohibitions on interstate ownership of banking facilities
are falling.I Congress has left it to the individual states to say when and how banks
in each state may participate in interstate ownership arrangements. 2 Recognizing an
overall national interest in the developing structure of banking, Congress has retained
national authority to review and approve specific combinations. 3 Despite this
requirement, a pattern of combinations has emerged among the leading and major
banks in the various states that allow interstate banking. This poses a major question
for national banking policy: Should such combinations be generally permitted?
On its face, this pattern is troubling. A major stimulus to the development of our
present banking system, with its diversity of services and efficient production
techniques, has been vigorous competition. While bankers once believed that
competition was contrary to the public interest, 4 they now, in congressional
testimony at least, claim economic competition is an important means wo insure the
public interest in an efficient, equitable, and progressive banking system. 5 Moreover,
economic theory, as well as historical and cross-sectional analyses of banking and
financial services generally, all confirmn the proposition that competition is an
important positive force. 6 Yet, interstate bank ownership does not increase compe-
tition directly, and affiliation among market leaders in different states will tend to link
and entrench regional oligopoly.
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago's 1986 Conference on Bank Structure and Competition. I have benefited from the comments
that I received as a result. In addition, Edsel Guydon, J.D., 1988, University of Wisconsin, provided helpful research
assistance. Finally, I am indebted to Professor Edward Rubin who critically reviewed a later draft.
1. By early 1987, 40 states had authorized some form of interstate bank ownership. R. Jo,,s & B. PuLs,
IrERs-rATE BANKING: A SmIARY OF STATE LAws (1987). See also Simonson, Full-Service Interstate Banking Statutes:
The Conditions of Entry, 11 OKLA. Crry U.L. REv. 723 (1986).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982).
4. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 368-70 (1963).
5. Hearings Before Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. Super., Reg. and Ins. of the House Comm. on Banking, Fin. and
Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 216-40 (Apr. 24 & 25, 1985) (statement of James G. Cairns, Jr.) [hereinafter Bank
Hearings].
6. Economic theory recommends competition because it produces lower prices and greater output than other
market structures. See, e.g., F. SCHtERER, INDUsRIAL ORANizAXiON AND MARKET Smucrnu 12-14 (2d ed. 1980). Both
historical and cross-sectional studies confirm the validity of this theory in that more competitive banking structures have
yielded better performance. See, e.g., Berger & Hannan, The Price-Concentration Relationship in Banking, FED. Ras.
BD., FiN. AND EcoN. DMscuastoN SEss No. 23 (Apr. 1988); Clark, The Efficient Structure Hypothesis: More Evidence
from Banking, 27 Q. Rsv. EcoN. & Bus. 25 (1987); Evenoff & Fortier, Geographic Deregulation ofBanking: An Analysis
of the Impact, Corsi ,cE on BANK STRucr. ANo Comp. 701 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago, May 14-16, 1986) [hereinafter
BANK Co.,.E]EREsI; Gilbert, Studies of Bank Market Structure and Competition: A Review and Evaluation, 16 J. MoNY,
CREorr & BANKING 617 (1984); Stevens, Bank Market Concentration and Costs: Is There X- Inefficiency in Banking?, 18
Bus. EcoN. 36 (1983).
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Historically, the real but economically artificial limits on interstate ownership
preserved a dispersed and unconcentrated national banking structure. Moreover,
these limits had no serious efficiency costs. Over the years, the banking system has
successfully solved the need for specific types of interstate integration by a great
variety of cooperative efforts not involving interstate ownership of banks. These
efforts apparently satisfied the economic needs for integrating the banking system and
for providing services requiring greater geographic scope or greater resources than
possessed by individual banks or banking organizations. Hence, there is no obvious
efficiency justification for interstate bank ownership. Nonetheless, the banking
community has vigorously insisted upon the right to combine on an interstate basis.
State legislatures have generally approved. Judge Posner observed that when a
regulated and protected industry obtains new rights which lack clear economic
justification, it is at best problematic whether the result will be service to the public
interest.7
This Article focuses on the merits of allowing interstate combinations of leading
banks. In a nutshell, my thesis is that such combinations are extremely unlikely to
produce otherwise unachievable, positive social benefits. Rather, these combinations
are reasonably likely to produce a variety of undesirable social and economic effects.
I should acknowledge at the outset that these negatives may not be substantively
great. Nevertheless, given the lack of any generally positive effects, the net social
cost-benefit balance is negative for such interstate combinations. This conclusion
mandates a presumption against allowing combinations of leading banks. It also
suggests that the present policy of the Federal Reserve Board (Board) of allowing
large interstate banking combinations is at best ill-advised. Policy makers and
enforcers ought to view such combinations very differently. Thus, I conclude that the
present pattern of combinations in interstate banking presents a cause for concern.
I want to emphasize the limited nature of this critique. First, this is not a
challenge to the idea of interstate bank ownership as such; instead, my analysis
suggests that the public gains from any such combinations have been greatly
exaggerated. The only concern addressed here is with a type of interstate bank
combination that presently occurs.
Second, the focus of this analysis is strictly limited to the question of ownership.
Bank regulation also entails many limits on what banks may do. Such conduct
regulation is clearly distinguishable from ownership controls. The historical record as
to conduct regulation suggests that such controls have had significant economic
effects, many of which have been negative. 8 The clear positive consequences of
deregulation of conduct controls, e.g., eliminating controls on interest on savings and
7. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGM'T Sci. 22 (1971); cfi. Benson, The Economic Theory
of Regulation as an Explanation of Policies Toward Bank Mergers and Holding Company Acquisitions, 28 Aierniusr
BULL. 839 (1983).
8. See Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1 (1976); Hackley, Our Baffling Banking
System, 52 VA. L. REv. 565 (1966); Loring & Brundy, The Deregulation of Banks, 42 WVASH. & LEE L. REV. 347
(1985); Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAr. L. REv. 1 (1977); Taggert,
Effects of Deposit Rate Ceilings, 10 J. MoNEY, CREDTrr & BANKiNG 139 (1978); Wynne & Spagnole, The Myth of Bank
Deregulation, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 383 (1985).
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demand deposits, has inspired suggestions for eliminating all controls over banking
structure and conduct. However, the success of conduct deregulation has as an
important predicate a structurally competitive market. Without competitive pressures,
financial institutions are less likely to initiate desirable conduct or to maximize
consumer welfare. Hence, the success of conduct deregulation provides no justifi-
cation for elimination of structural controls and may depend, in the long run, on their
continued viability.
Third, the case against certain interstate combinations expressly assumes that
other methods of entry, including entry by newly organized banks, remains
available. 9 Manifestly, if existing competitors can make a market incontestable by
obtaining a prohibition against important forms of entry, then the consequences for
the public interest and consumer welfare will probably be negative. The central
problem in such situations is to facilitate entry in ways that enhance competition.
The focus of concern of this Article is the incremental positive or negative effect of
permitting or restricting entry by one specific method: acquisition of a leading
banking organization. 10
This Article will first document that the pattern of bank combinations which is
of concern does exist. Second, it will identify and evaluate the possible advantages
to the public that may arise from such combinations. Third, it will catalogue and
appraise the risks to the public interest and consumer welfare that may result from
interstate combinations. Fourth, it will explain why, despite few real advantages and
many potential risks, interstate combinations are likely to occur absent controls.
Fifth, a simple cost-benefit analysis will demonstrate that the questionable gains from
allowing large bank combinations do not justify the potential social costs. The
implication of this conclusion is that such combinations ought to be forbidden. The
final part discusses the possible legal and administrative means of controlling large
bank combinations.
II. THE TROUBLESOME COMBINATIONS
Interstate banking came first on a regional basis to New England and the
Southeast. It has now spread to the Midwest, Middle Atlantic, Southwest, and the Far
West. While many states still limit the interstate ownership of banks to banking
organizations serving adjacent or regional areas, there is a trend in various state
statutes toward allowing nationwide ownership, provided that the other state offers
9. In fact, entry by acquisition of small and mid-sized bank organizations occurs as does entry by de novo
chartering. See infra note 53 for examples. Some states forbid entry by new charter or acquisition of recently chartered
banks. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 26-2607(d) (Supp. 1988) (bank must have been in business more than four years); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 221.58(4)(f) (vest Supp. 1987) (bank must have been chartered five years or more). Such limits raise
important questions about the legislative motivations in authorizing interstate banking, but it is also questionable how
effective those limits would be. Cf. United States v. Citizens & Southern Bancorp., 422 U.S. 86 (1975); United States
v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (both cases discuss ways to evade analogous restrictions). For a critical
commentary on such restrictive entry rules, see Ginsberg, Interstate Banking, 9 HoFsrRA L. Rav. 1133 (1981).
10. I have consciously chosen not to define with any exactness what constitutes a "large" bank. As the following
discussion will show, the source of concern is interstate combinations among banks ranked as being one of the top four
or five largest in their home state (and sometimes additional states) combining with similarly ranked banks in still other
states.
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reciprocity as to ownership of banks within its borders.'1 Within each region, and
now nationally, a similar pattern has emerged: large and leading banks in different
states are combining.
In New England, the largest bank holding company in the region owns the
largest banking organization in Massachusetts, the second largest banking organiza-
tions in Maine and Rhode Island, and the fourth largest banking organization in
Connecticut.12 The second largest New England banking organization has acquired
what was, at the time, the largest bank in Connecticut, the second largest bank in
Massachusetts, the fourth largest bank in Maine, as well as the fifth largest bank in
Rhode Island. 13 Another organization has recently combined two major New England
holding companies resulting in the combined ownership of the largest banking
organization in Connecticut, the third largest bank in Massachusetts, and the fourth
largest bank in Rhode Island. 14 In addition, the largest banking organization in Rhode
Island controls the fifth largest bank in Maine and the tenth largest bank in New
York.15
A similar pattern exists in the Southeast. The largest bank in North Carolina
combined with the second largest bank in Georgia.1 6 Meanwhile, the second largest
bank in North Carolina has combined with the third largest bank in South Carolina,
acquired the fourth largest banking organization in Florida, and has recently acquired
the largest banking organization in Texas. 17 The third largest bank in Georgia joined
forces with the second largest banking organization in Florida and has since acquired
the largest banking organization in Tennessee. 18 The largest banking organization in
Georgia is also the fifth largest banking organization in Florida and the second largest
banking organization in South Carolina. 19 The third largest bank in North Carolina is
also the sixth largest banking organization in Florida, the fourth largest bank in South
Carolina, and the fourth largest bank in Georgia. 20 These organizations also are
continuing to acquire additional banks.
The Middle Atlantic, Midwestern, and Western states seem poised for similar
consolidations. The largest bank in Virginia has combined with the fourth largest
banking organizations in Maryland and Tennessee. 2 1 The fourth largest Virginia bank
has acquired the sixth largest bank in Maryland. 22 The largest Maryland bank has
11. See R. JoNEs & B. PuLs, supra note 1; Simonson, supra note 1.
12. Bank of Boston, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 737, 738 (1984).
13. Bank of New Eng. Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 138, 139 (1986).
14. Shawmut Nat'l Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 182, 183 (1988).
15. Fleet Fin. Group Inc., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 62 (1988); Fleet Fin. Group Inc., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 265 (1986).
In order to make its New York acquisition, Fleet must divest its Connecticut holdings that represent the sixth largest
banking organization in that state. Fleet, 74 Fed. Res. Bull. at 63.
16. First Wachovia Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 61, 69 (1986).
17. NCNB, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 57, 59 (1986); see also NCNB, 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 618 (1988) (order approving
acquisition of First Republic Bank, the largest banking organization in Texas); Apcar, First Republic Bailout MayDamage
Capital-Raising Efforts by Other Banks, wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
18. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 67 (1987); SunTrust Banks, Inc., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 176 (1985).
19. Citizens & Southern Bank, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 260, 260 (1986).
20. First Union Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 798, 799 (1986); First Union Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 263, 269 (1986).
21. Sovran Fin. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 939 (1987); Sovran Fin. Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 276, 277 (1986).
22. Bank of Va. Co., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 65, 66 (1986).
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acquired the second largest bank in the District of Columbia.2 3 The second largest
Pennsylvania banking organization has acquired the second largest Kentucky banking
organization. 2 4 The third largest Pennsylvania banking organization has acquired the
sixth largest banking organization in New Jersey, and the second largest banking
organization in New Jersey has acquired the sixth largest Pennsylvania banking
organization. 25 The fourth largest Pennsylvania bank has combined with the largest
New Jersey banking organization. 26 In addition, the fifth largest Pennsylvania
banking organization is combining with the third largest bank in Delaware. 27
In the Midwest, the second largest bank in Ohio has acquired the second largest
bank in Indiana and the third largest banking organization in Wisconsin.2 8 The largest
banking organization in Ohio has acquired the largest bank in Kentucky. 29 The largest
Michigan banking organization is also the fifth largest Illinois banking
organization. 30 Many similar combinations are in the discussion stages.31
In the Far West, the First Interstate system, a relic of a period prior to control
over interstate bank ownership, owns large banking organizations in Idaho, Utah,
Nevada, Oregon, Arizona, California, Washington, and Colorado. It has recently
acquired the fifth largest banking organization in Texas. 32 The third largest California
bank has acquired the second largest bank in Washington and the third largest banks
in Arizona and Oregon.3 3 The largest bank in California owns the largest bank in
Washington.3 4 In addition, the largest bank in Oregon now owns the third largest
banking organization in Washington. 35
The pattern that emerges is clear and consistent. Leading bank organizations are
combining. 36 The targets are sufficiently identifiable that a computer analysis can
readily predict which ones they are.37
The question the next two parts address is the identification of costs and benefits
associated with this pattern of combination.
23. MNC Fin. Inc., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 740 (1987).
24. PNC Fin. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 227 (1987).
25. Midlantic Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 63 (1987); Core States Fin. Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 796 (1986).
26. FFB, Inc., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 177 (1988).
27. Meridian Bancorp., Inc., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 51 (1988).
28. Bane One Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 174, 176 (1988); Banc One Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 124 (1987).
29. National City Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 581, 582 (1988).
30. NBD Bancorp. Inc., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 53, 54 (1988).
31. See Phillis & Pavel, Interstate Banking Game Plans: Implicationsfor the Midwest, EcoNoMc PsacrnvEs No.
23 (Fed Res. Bank of Chicago, Mar.iApr. 1986).
32. Fst Interstate Bank Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 881, 882 (1987).
33. Security Pacific Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 746 (1987); Security Pacific Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 381 (1987);
Security Pacific Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 881, 882 (1986).
34. Bank of Am., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 568, 570 (1983).
35. U.S. Bancorp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 941, 942 (1987).
36. As nationwide banking becomes lawful, more interregional combinations will also occur. See, e.g., Chemical
N.Y. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 378 (1987) (third largest bank in New York acquired fourth largest bank in Texas).
37. See Phillis & Pavel, supra note 31.
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H. THE POTENTIAL GAINS FROM LARGE BANK MERGERS
This Part discusses the potential gains that large bank mergers can produce. The
central question is: What are the expected public benefits of allowing interstate
combinations of large banks? Three types of sources might provide initial answers to
that query: legislative testimony, decisions authorizing such combinations, and
scholarly writing. Each type has been examined and, surprisingly, few claims of
benefits have emerged for examination. 38 This in itself is an observation of some
significance. The primary policy arguments for interstate banking have nothing to do
with the size of the banking organizations. Instead, the arguments are of the
beneficial impact of freedom and the advantages of unprotected, competitively
structured banking markets. The combinations here under review directly advance
neither characteristic. Only by increasing the numbers of strong competitors serving
specific markets can the general effect of increased competition be achieved; and the
general value of freedom is fulfilled so long as banks can expand into any area in
which they find it economically rational to provide service. Thus, the basic rhetoric
justifying interstate banking is implicitly premised on the idea that the expansion be
by new entry or foothold acquisitions rather than by combinations of dominant firms.
Identifying the claims made for large bank combinations is, however, only the
first step. Each claim must then be examined critically to determine whether it
qualifies as a valid benefit. Even if some private benefit might arise, to be a public
benefit, it should satisfy an important condition: The benefit must be one that would
not occur absent a merger or, if the benefit could occur absent a merger, it would arise
only at significantly greater costs or be so delayed or incomplete as to make it
substantially less worthwhile. 39 By definition, all other "benefits" of a combination
could be achieved without the costs associated with interstate mergers and so can
neither justify any such costs nor qualify as public benefits in this context.40
A second important, but more empirical, question is the durability of the benefit.
Transient benefits have less social utility than long term benefits. A short run gain
resulting from a merger can logically offset a short run cost. When the cost is long
run but the gain exists only for a limited time, a more critical appraisal is essential.
Such an analysis requires selecting an appropriate perspective. Traditionally, eco-
nomic analysis has focused on present values, which has the effect of discounting the
future. 41 A future-oriented concern would reverse that and discount present gains
38. In order to avoid setting up straw people and then demolishing them, I have not extended the list of possible
benefits by adding my own nominees. However, my own review and reflection has not suggested any additional benefits
which advocates of interstate banking have not identified which would be worthy of consideration.
39. This criterion rests on basic notions of allocative and productive efficiency, but also has explicit roots in bank
merger control. United States v. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171, 189 (1968); Carstensen, Regulating
Banking in the Public Interest: The Case for an Open Approach to Chartering and Branching, 57 TEx. L. Ray. 1035
(1979) [hereinafter Carstensen I].
40. As will be discussed, see infra notes 84-98 and accompanying text, it is possible to have a situation in which
there are neither public benefits nor public costs. Such a situation would have to be resolved based on some a priori
presumption.
41. For an extensive discussion of these issues, see Heller, The Importance of Normative Decision-Making: The
Limitations of Legal Economics as a Basis for a Liberal Jurisprudence-As Illustrated by the Regulation of Vacation
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which will not last into the future. For example, "improved management," 42 a
frequent claim, is usually no more than the particular present abilities of those in
charge of the surviving institution. Absent some assurance of continued, improved
management, the significance of any such social benefit that arises as a result of
merger seems marginal. The "publicness" of a benefit and its durability will be the
two criteria by which the claimed benefits of large interstate bank combinations can
be examined.
A. Congressional Hearings
The banking community has repeatedly sought national legislation authorizing
interstate bank combinations. This legislation would pre-empt the various exclusion-
ary schemes embedded in many existing state laws, and could open up states that
have exercised their existing right to exclude interstate banking. 43 Despite the
agitation, there have been few hearings actually devoted to building a record in
support of interstate banking. The most substantial and clearly representative hearing
was in 1985. That hearing revealed only three claims made on behalf of interstate
bank ownership that could be attributed to all interstate combinations. 44
Then Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker, and spokesmen for major banks,
claimed that interstate banking would stimulate actual and potential competition.
Competition is very desirable for banking because it stimulates banks to provide new
services and brings about a reduction in the prices charged for existing services. 45
Certainly the theoretical and empirical work on banking strongly supports this
contention. Moreover, improved competition is a public benefit because it causes
lower prices, improved quality, and more innovation. The relevant question is not,
however, whether actual or potential competition is desirable, but how interstate
banking and, specifically, interstate combinations of large banks can contribute
positively to competition. Two possible connections might exist between interstate
bank ownership and increasing actual or potential competition.
First, if banks in many states were too small in aggregate asset size to be
efficient or were unable to offer a full range of the services needed by their customers,
then interstate mergers, which increased substantially the size of the resulting banking
organization, could convert it into an effective competitor, thus creating a public
benefit. If this argument is correct, then we would expect evidence that banking
involves substantial scale economies and that the size of a bank is closely related to
the range of services that it can provide. This evidence would also suggest the scale
Home Development, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 385; for the traditional present value perspective, see W. KLtsi & J. CotnE-,
BusmEss ORGAtazAzroN AND FtNANcE 261-81 (3d ed. 1988).
42. See, e.g., Security Pacific Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 381, 383 (1987) (assuming for the moment that improved
management is a benefit only achievable by merger). But see Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. at 189.
43. See Miller, Interstate Banking in the Court, 1985 Sup. Cr. Rev. 179; Frieder, The Interstate Banking
Landscape: Legislative Policies and Rationale, 6 ComrEso. PoL'Y IssuEs 41 (1988).
44. Bank Hearings, supra note 5. Although many other hearings have been held on banking issues, this is the only
recent hearing to focus directly on these questions.
45. Id. at 5, 7 (statement of then Chairman Volcker); id. at 223 (statement of Am. Bankers Ass'n); id. at 491
(statement of John B. McCoy, Bane One Corp.).
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required to achieve the necessary minimum aggregate size. This in turn would
provide the basic criterion for determining whether particular combinations served the
public interest.
Second, if banking markets were so oligopolistic or monopolistic that the
existing banks were overcharging and underserving their customers, then the addition
of new competitors in such markets would be likely to stimulate more service and
lower prices. Interstate banking organizations might be better able to underwrite the
costs of such new competition and might, because of their aggregate size, be better
able to compete effectively from the outset.
The existing structure and well-known economic characteristics of the American
banking system suggest that neither of these logical links between competition and
interstate banking will provide a basis for finding benefits in interstate combinations
of major banks.
Most studies of bank efficiency have reported that banks achieve scale
economies at fifty to one hundred million dollars in deposits and that scope
economies are not very substantial. 46 The consensus is that local banks can easily
survive the onslaught of the large interstate banks. 47 Hence, each state already has
substantial numbers of banks of efficient competitive size. Moreover, the aggregate
size of a particular bank has only a limited bearing on its capacity to offer a wide
range of services. Even a relatively small bank can provide specialized services
through its correspondent relationships with other banks. In such situations, the local
bank retails the services of a larger bank. Therefore, poor performance due to a lack
of scale is wholly implausible as a justification for large interstate bank mergers.
The risks of anticompetitive oligopoly in local bank markets may be a better
basis for encouraging interstate bank ownership. 48 Competition stimulates desirable
conduct and performance. The question is whether there are serious existing problems
with local market structures and how the combination of large banks would redress
any such problems. Except with respect to one isolated, rural Ohio county, no
evidence even suggested that there is a demonstrable problem of uncompetitiveness
in banking markets today. 49 Moreover, if local market power were a major problem,
the various federal banking agencies would not approve combinations that would
46. Bentson, Hanweck & Humphrey, Scale Economies in Banking, 14 1. Moty, CREDrT & BANKING 435 (1982).
See also D. FP.AsER & J. Kot.r., THE FtrruRE oF SMALL BANmS IN A DMEGULATED ENvmoNImENT (1985); Berger, Hanweck
& Humphrey, Competitive Liability in Banking: Scale, Scope, and Product Mix Economies, FED. Ras. BD. REs. PAPER
iN BAtNKc AND FIN. EcON. (Jan. 1986); Frieder, The Southern Financial Market Place: The Florida Interstate Banking
Study, CO . ON BANK SmRc. AND COMe. 23 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago, 1984); Goldberg & Hanweck, What Can We
Expect From Interstate Banking, 12 J. BANKiNG & Fm. 51 (1988) (examination of comparative performance of interstate
banks with more localized banks revealed no long run efficiency advantage for interstate banks); Nelson, OptimalBanking
Structure: Implications for Interstate Banking, 6 Comrrip. POL'Y Iss. 13 (1988). Cf. Brownstein, The Big Are Getting
Bigger as Banks Across the Nation Buy Other Banks, NAT'L J., Oct., 1, 1983, at 2004 (quoting Federal Reserve Board
staff and financial analysts to the effect that large banks are relatively inefficient and could improve profitability by getting
smaller, not bigger).
47. See D. FRAsER & J. KoLAP, supra note 46; Goldberg & Hanwick, supra note 46; Nelson, supra note 46.
48. Studies generally find a correlation between concentration and performance suggesting increased concentration
results in less desirable performance. See supra note 6.
49. Bank Hearings, supra note 5, at 495 (statement of John B. McCoy). If anything, the bankers claimed that other
financial services have more competitive ability and are more flexible than banks, making the financial services markets
in which banks compete more, rather than less, competitive.
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directly eliminate competition in such markets. Yet the agencies routinely approve
almost every combination proposal. These approvals include findings that such
combinations of direct competitors raise no serious competitive concerns.50 This
directly contradicts any claimed need for interstate expansion to increase competition.
The interminable debate over the effects of structure on performance also
suggests that local banking markets are not seriously exploited even when highly
concentrated. 5' This is a consequence of the number of ways in which banking
organizations can compete without ownership entry and the wide variety of nonbank
financial institutions able to compete in local markets. 52 This undermines the claim
that ownership entry is essential to limiting the exploitation of local market power.
Second, the logic of a need to increase local market competition demands that
entry come via de novo expansion or foothold type acquisitions.5 3 The acquisition of
leading banks in local markets by large out-of-area organizations would strengthen
the leading banks and entrench the local oligopoly, reducing both actual and potential
competition. Hence, the combinations being evaluated here would not contribute
directly to increasing competition. Interstate combinations might contribute indirectly
by making an existing dominant bank less effective as a local market force as a result
of increased bureaucratization. 54 But, the crippling of a competitor, making it less
effective and efficient relative to other institutions, is so perverse that it is
unreasonable to regard it as a public benefit. A second indirect positive competitive
effect would occur if the new bank could and would make entry into other
concentrated markets that neither of its predecessors would have or could have done.
Why the predecessors, which by hypothesis are already large banks, would not by
themselves enter these other markets, but the resulting large bank would, is hard to
explain in theory, and no example comes readily to mind.5 5 In addition, no Federal
Reserve Board decision has justified acquisition of a bank in a state on the basis of
the need for improved competition in that state.
Perhaps the most important point about the claimed need to improve banking
competition is that if it is a valid argument, it would argue against combinations
50. See, e.g., First Am. Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 567, 567-68 (1988) (merger approved between competing
banks producing a 146 point increase in the HHI index in a highly concentrated market).
51. The question that has been repeatedly investigated is how much effect structure has on performance. See
articles cited supra notes 6, 46.
52. For a discussion of the impacts of thrifts, see Watro, Local Thrift Competition and Bank Earnings, EcoN.
Co.. IENrARY (Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland, Nov. 1, 1987).
53. Such entry does occur. See, e.g., NCNB Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 61 (1986) (entry into Atlanta by acquisition
of a small bank); Fleet Fin. Group, Inc., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 834 (1984) (entry into Boston and Hartford by de novo banks);
Hartford Nat'l Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 353 (1984) (entry into Boston by purchase of an institution having a small share).
In none of these cases did the Federal Reserve represent that the market being entered was so concentrated that entry was
essential to stimulate competition.
54. Shull, The Structural Impact of Multiple Office Banking in New York and Virginia, 23 ANmrusT BuLL. 511
(1978) (study of market extension acquisitions showing acquired banks lost market share).
55. Manifestly, this is not a situation in which regulatory limits are a problem, This is purely a problem of which
institutions can and will enter a particular area. It bears emphasis here that one must consider all potential entry vehicles
and claims that interstate banks make a noticeable contribution to the pool of such potential entrants. Cf. Frieder, et al.,
Legislating for Interstate Bank Expansion: Financial Deregulation and Public Policy, 9 J. CoRp. LAw 673, 749 (1984).
1405
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
between large banks in different states. Such combinations are unnecessary for
efficiency and are the least likely to improve competition in either market. 56
Whatever the merits of the claim that interstate banking will improve competi-
tion in general, the claim provides little basis for combinations involving large banks.
If anything, the claim that it is important to increase competition would suggest that
such mergers are undesirable. The only exception would be a very unusual, but easily
identifiable case, in which the resulting bank would be a meaningful potential
competitor in markets in which its constituent banks could not compete, absent a
merger. In addition, for the gain to be at all meaningful, the market(s) thus opened
would have to have high existing concentration.5 7 Finally, to get the potential social
benefit, it would be necessary to require that the new bank enter the target market de
novo or by a foothold acquisition. This once again shows that combinations between
large and locally dominant banks are a potential source of competitive concern.
A second argument advanced to Congress by proponents of interstate bank
mergers is that the new interstate combinations would provide increased consumer
services. Somehow the interstate bank, representing a multibillion dollar combina-
tion, will do things for consumers that its constituent banks, each with several billion
dollars in assets, had not done and could not do before. Specific examples of new or
improved services were rare. One banker did claim that many people cross state lines
and attempt to cash checks, but they cannot because their bank does not have offices
in the adjacent state.58 Should one be more concerned about the manifest ignorance
of a banker who makes such a statement or the legislator who fails to challenge it?
In fact, bank customers already have many services, including bank credit cards
and check guarantee programs, which allow them to cash checks or obtain cash
transfers throughout the United States and much of the world. Moreover, most
predictions about interstate bank combinations suggest that in significant areas of the
country, only nonownership systems will make it possible to get access to bank
services.
Generally, existing large banks already compete in consumer services outside
their home states through nonbank subsidiaries, correspondent arrangements, and
direct interstate services such as credit card programs. Given all the means by which
banks compete to provide consumer services, it is hard to see why ownership of a
bank in another state, let alone a large bank, has any logical relation to the scope or
56. One empirical study reported that intermarket combinations among leading banks tended to cause the acquired
bank to lose market share. Shull, supra note 54. See also Apcar & Brown, Small Texas Towns Are the Latest Victims of
Business Banks' Crisis, Vall St. J., May 25, 1988, at 1, col. 6; Helyar, Multistate Banks Rile Many Customers, Wall St.
J., Apr. 20, 1988, at 21, col. 3. Given the likely efficiency costs of such combinations, such results are understandable.
See Nelson, supra note 46. The idea that intermarket combinations among leading banks should be favored because of
their crippling effects on the participants seems very dubious from the standpoint of broader policy concern with the
safety, soundness, and viability of banks.
57. The merger of several banks which as a result can now enter New York City, Chicago, or Los Angeles does
not significantly add to the competitiveness of these markets and so lacks any substantial positive feature to offset any
negative effects.
58. Bank Hearings, supra note 5, at 163, 506 (statements of John W. Woods, Ass'n of Bank Holding Companies
and of John Petty, Marine Midland Bank). Cf. Marine Bank, Our Name Change Raises Some Good Questions, Spring
1988 (brochure of Wisconsin bank being acquired by an Ohio bank to its customers justifying the merger by promising
check cashing "at any ... office ... in the Midwest with proper identification") (emphasis added).
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quality of services offered. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that, in many regions,
interstate bank ownership has caused a deterioration of the quality of consumer
services.5 9 Interstate banks may be more adept at exploiting consumers by charging
higher prices for services, but it is at least questionable if they improve services .6 In
sum, consumer advantages from interstate bank combinations are not evident or
substantial, and no consumer advantages seem to turn on the combination of
ownership of large banks.
The third argument for interstate bank mergers advanced at congressional
hearings was that the resulting banks would be more able to provide large loans to
commercial and industrial borrowers. 61 Once again this claim requires careful inquiry
as to the need for large traditional loans and, assuming a need, the ways in which this
need might be fulfilled.
The first question that must be answered is whether or not the addition of more
banks, which are able to make large loans on their own, is a desirable goal. If the
change from a loan limit of ten million dollars per customer to one of thirty or forty
million dollars were important, there should be evidence that borrowers needing loans
in the thirty to forty million dollar range are unable to find them in the market at
competitive rates. In fact, recurring reports of low earnings from corporate lending
programs by the largest banks, and their other well-documented problems with large
loans, suggest that borrowers already have a competitive loan market. 62 Nor is there
evidence that the large banks that have merged have made any appreciable number of
loans at or near their lending limits or that these banks had worthy customers whose
needs were not accommodated prior to the merger. Consequently, there is no
evidence of a need for significantly increased loan limits of the sort produced by the
combination of large interstate banks.
Equally important, interstate combinations will rarely increase the quantity of
large loan lending actually available to customers. In other words, the availability of
large loans is independent of the specific size of the bank that arranges the loan. A
smaller bank originating large loans beyond its own lending limit generally
cooperates with other banks to cover that portion of the loan that is beyond its own
lending limits. This participation in lending has a number of virtues. It is a good risk
distributor, and an efficient way to diversify portfolios. In the long run, multibank
cooperation in lending is likely to be more efficient than single firm efforts because
each participant has incentives to innovate and to develop alternatives. The greater
59. See Helyar, supra note 56.
60. See, e.g., Mitchell, Banc One Breaks Mold and Gets Ahead, wall St. J., June 13, 1988, at 17, col. 1; Spivak,
Banc One Changes Indiana Game, Milwaukee Sentinel, Apr. 1, 1988, sec. 2, at 5, col. 3 (both stories suggest Bane One
has succeeded in raising consumer prices in banks it has acquired). See also Bailey, Major Credit Card Issuers Tighten
Grip on Market Despite High Interest Charges, Wall St. J., July 29, 1988, at 17, col. 4.
61. Bank Hearings, supra note 5. Overall, without interstate ownership, bank sizes have kept pace with the growth
of their customers. Rhodes, Are the Big Banks Big Enough?, 26 ATrrrmusr BuLL. 315 (1981).
62. Baer, Regulatory Burden Handicaps Low-Risk Banking, CHICAGO FEi. LE'rER No. 5 (Jan. 1988) (from 1975
to 1985, bank lending to large manufacturers has declined dramatically). Mitchell, Mellon Faces Obstacles in
Restructuring, Vall St. J., Aug. 9, 1988, at 26, col. 3; see also Gregorash & Ford, Banking 1987: A Year of Reckoning,
12 ECoN. PERspEcr. No. 4, at 1, 5-6 (1988) (in both 1986 and 1987 the largest banks, those over $10 billion in assets,
had average returns substantially below smaller banks).
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flexibility of this ad hoc cooperative system means that participants can compete both
within the project to provide key services as well as outside the project to innovate
new solutions. This provides more intense competitive pressure on the lending system
insuring both productive and dynamic efficiency. Indeed, one of the most important
innovations in the banking business over the last 100 years has been the development
of cooperative systems for making large loans. 63 Hence, increased lending limits for
individual banks do not respond to any clear social need. Even assuming a need,
combination among large banks is not the best way to accumulate the funds needed
for very large loans. Therefore, no public benefit results from the increased lending
limits.
Banks provide other services to their major customers. However, no one has
claimed that interstate merger is essential for providing these services. Manifestly,
the correspondent banking system is such that it would be almost impossible to find
an important and profitable service that could not be efficiently delivered anywhere
in the country where customers might want it.
For more than 100 years, American banks have used various types of
cooperative efforts to provide for interstate delivery of services and to provide funds
for any loan request which is beyond the limit of any particular bank. As a result, it
is not surprising that the proponents of interstate bank mergers could not produce a
significant record of activities or services that would be enhanced by interstate
ownership combinations.
In sum, despite the ardent advocacy of interstate banking by a wide range of
witnesses, the legislative hearings failed to provide credible support for interstate
consolidations of major banks.
B. The Federal Reserve Opinions
The Board opinions approving interstate combinations provide a second and
potentially better source of possible justifications for such mergers. In order to be
approved, any interstate combination must satisfy the "convenience and needs"
criterion. 64 This requires the Board to find that the merger will make a positive
contribution to the public interest. 65
Unfortunately, in cases involving combinations of banks having leading
positions in two states, the Board's standard statement is: "Considerations relating to
the convenience and needs of the communities to be served are also consistent with
approval.''66 This is hardly illuminating except in the negative. Manifestly, the
Board's opinion writers could find nothing specific nor positive to say about the
63. See Keehn, Market Power and Bank Lending: Some Evidence from Wisconsin, 1870-1900, 40 J. Eco.t. Hrsr.
45 (1980).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1982).
65. See Carstensen I, supra note 39, at 1113-25; see also Carstensen, Restricting the Power to Promote
Competition in Banking: A Foolish Consistency Among the Circuits, 1983 DUKE L.J. 580 [hereinafter Carstensen II].
66. E.g., First Vachovia Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 68, 70 (1986); accord Banc One Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 174,
176 (1988); Fleet Fin. Group, 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 62, 65 (1988); Sovran Fin. Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 276, 278 (1986);
Bank of Boston, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 737, 739 (1984); Bank of Boston, 70 Fed. Res. Bull., 524, 525 (1984).
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public benefits from interstate combinations. In its SunTrust opinion, the Board
declared that:
Applicant has stated that the proposed combination ... will permit each to offer improved
and expanded services to customers and to the communities they serve. Accordingly, the
Board has determined that considerations relating to the convenience and needs . . .are
consistent with approval. 67
Because that is the full text, we do not know what services were needed that a 7.3
billion dollar banking organization and a 3.7 billion dollar banking organization could
not individually provide, but could only be provided if they combined to create an 11
billion dollar institution.
In a number of recent decisions, the Board has discussed challenges to the
merger based on the requirements of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)68
within its convenience and needs discussion. 69 Because bank agencies must deny
requests for mergers of banks failing to comply with the bank's duty under the CRA,
local groups have challenged combinations in an effort to force the applicant and,
rarely, the acquired bank, to perform better. The Board apparently uses its review
procedures to require acquiring banks to improve their conduct at their existing
facilities. 70 The Board uses a positive finding on the CRA issue as a basis for a
positive convenience and needs conclusion. Requiring a bank to live up to its
statutory duty is in some sense a positive result, but it has nothing to do with the
acquisition of a leading bank in another state except as a bribe.
To put it bluntly, the Board's decisions authorizing interstate combinations
provide no basis for the belief that any specific public benefit will result from these
combinations. Moreover, there is some empirical evidence to give reason to doubt
that even the claimed benefits will be provided. 71
In a few cases, usually involving the acquisition of a less substantial bank, the
Board has made more specific findings which show just how minimal the real
advantages are of even smaller interstate combinations. Thus, in approving Hartford
National's acquisition of Arltru Bancorporation in Boston, Massachusetts, the Board
declared that the combination "would permit Arltru to provide additional credit
capacity to serve more and larger commercial customers ... [and to] expand ... [its]
trust department as well as its mortgage lending, municipal financing, and commer-
cial banking services." 72 But, a page earlier, the Board reported that Hartford already
had a loan production office in Boston. Hence, Hartford's "additional credit
67. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 71 Fed, Res. Bull. 176, 179 (1985) (emphasis added).
68. 12 US.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1982).
69. See, e.g., National City Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 581, 583-85 (1988); Shawmut Nat'l Corp., 74 Fed. Res.
Bull. 152, 185 (1988); Valley Nat'l Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 57, 58-59 (1988); Sovran Fin. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull.
939, 941 (1987); First Interstate Bankcorp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 881, 883 (1987).
70. See, e.g., Sovran Fin. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 939 (1987); state regulators seem to use the same tactic. See
Comerica Purchase is Tied to Proposal For Detroit Lending, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1988, at 4, col. 2 (Michigan banking
commissioner conditioned grant of right to buy a Texas bank organization on Michigan acquirer improving its conduct in
Michigan).
71. Allardice, Convenience and Needs Considerations: A Post-Audit Survey, STAFF MMORANDA No. 78-2 (Fed.
Res. Bank of Chicago) (undated).
72. Hartford Nat'l Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 353, 355 (1984).
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capacity" as well as its capacity to provide any other lending services were already
present in the market. Hartford's combination with Arltru did not increase the sum of
services available to Boston area banking customers; it only altered and combined a
source of service. At most, this merger expanded a trust department in one Boston
area bank at the cost of eliminating existing competition in a variety of other lending
services. Moreover, there is no finding that an expansion of trust services would
improve either the competitive character of the market or lower significantly the costs
of providing trust services. 73 The Board declared that Boston area banking has a
highly competitive structure and made no separate findings about the trust business. 74
Hence, it is not clear that any positive effect will result from this combination, and
it is quite obvious that the findings with respect to the claimed positives do not satisfy
the conditions necessary to classify them as public benefits.
Similarly, in approving the acquisition of a 200 million dollar bank in Salt Lake
City, the Board found that the convenience and needs of the community would be
served because the combined entity would "enable [the] Bank to expand the scope
and array of its services.' 75 However, the acquirer, through two nonbank subsidiar-
ies, already provided all or most of these services in Salt Lake City.76 Consequently,
consumers of financial services in Salt Lake City did not receive any net increase in
the services being offered and lost a possible source of competing offers of service.
Once again, the public benefit criteria are not satisfied, even if one assumes that the
merger is a positive outcome for the bank in question. 77
In only one recent decision involving an interstate combination of large banks
has the Board even addressed a list of plausible positive factors. The Board listed
three positive features: injection of capital, increased managerial expertise, and
consolidated operations which would produce "anticipated benefits" in the form of
lower costs. 78 Recognizing the doubtfulness of the third claim,79 and the transience
of the second,80 the Board emphasized the injection of capital that would occur.8 1
Assuming that the target bank was not seriously embarrassed financially, this too is
a weak claim because options other than merger exist to provide capital. In short, the
expected positive gains from this combination seem minimal, unlikely, or of doubtful
duration.
73. To find a public benefit in this aspect of the transaction we must assume that scale is important in trust services
but effective competition requires a local presence. Nothing in the Board's opinion supports either assumption.
74. Hartford Nat'l Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 353, 354 (1984). See also Key Banks, Inc., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 587,
588 (1985) (the convenience and need justification for the takeover of a bank in Fairbanks, Alaska, came from an increase
in the number of banks in that market offering "automobile leasing, discount brokerage services, electronic banking
services, and credit life and accident and health insurance." Yet in no instance did the Board find that there was a need
for increased competition in any of these lines.).
75. Moore Fin. Group Inc., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 899, 900 (1985).
76. Id.
77. Indeed, in these opinions the Board has attempted to convert the public convenience and needs criterion into
a bank convenience and needs standard. This lacks statutory as well as policy justification.
78. Security Pacific Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 381, 383 (1987).
79. See Nelson, supra note 46; see also Staff, Davidson & McDonald, Increased Bank Merger Activity: Causes
and Effects, 24 Art. Bus. L.J. 67 (1984).
80. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
81. Security Pacific Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 381, 383 (1987).
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There is one final group of cases in which the Board has stronger evidence of
actual positive public benefits. These cases involve the acquisition of institutions with
serious capital deficiencies. When the acquirer is an out-of-state institution, the
combination produces an infusion of capital with a minimal elimination of existing
competition.8 2 In most cases of this type, direct investment in the weak bank is not
practical and its failure would produce a higher cost to the insurance fund and to those
whose banking relationships would be disrupted. Hence, allowing interstate combi-
nations in such situations provides positive results and confers public benefits. These
acquisitions provide an example of a valid public interest justification for interstate
combinations among large banks. What is striking is that this is the only instance of
a clear public benefit which emerges from a review of the many decisions authorizing
interstate combinations, and it justifies only a limited number of the actual
combinations.
In sum, the Federal Reserve opinions, like the legislative hearings, demonstrate
that there is no significant public advantage resulting from interstate combinations.
The minor advantages that were found were frequently already being provided
through means other than merger. Moreover, if there are any unfulfilled banking
service needs in these markets, it is evident that there are many means, other than
merger between leading banks, that will provide the needed service.8 3 The sole
exception to this conclusion is the acquisition of a failing bank.
C. The Academic Literature
A critical review of the academic literature in the areas of finance and law
similarly justifies the conclusion that interstate combinations between large banks
will rarely produce public benefits. The legal literature on interstate banking is largely
devoted to the legislative and constitutional issues with respect to regional banking
systems. 84 Other articles discuss the competitive impact (or lack of impact) of
82. See, e.g., First Interstate Bancorp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 881 (1987); Chemical N.Y. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull.
378 (1987); Bank of New Eng. Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 138 (1986); The Chase Manhattan Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull.
960 (1985); The Chase Manhattan Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 633 (1985); FNB Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 340 (1985).
83. One other claimed advantage that purportedly depends on a massive increase in the consolidation of banks
across the country revolves around the inefficiency of the present system of check collection. Berger & Humphrey, The
Role of Interstate Banking in the Diffusion of Electronic Payments Technology (Fed. Res. Bd. Working Paper, July 1985).
Despite the greater efficiency of other systems, the float advantage remains with the check writer. For competitive reasons
banks refuse to charge their customers the full costs of the inefficient system. This in turn keeps the more efficient systems
from being attractive. The authors theorize that if large numbers of interstate bank mergers occur, the resulting massive
banks will confront the float problem as an internal cost along with the internal cost of clearing checks inefficiently. They
will then respond by forcing their customers to use more efficient systems for clearing transactions and impose the costs
on the customer. The flaws in this claim are several. First, the source of the problem resides in the Uniform Commercial
Code which makes an economically undesirable allocation of rights. Change those rights, and the problem will be
self-correcting. Second, banks have already identified the customers who can most reduce bank costs by switching to other
payments systems. By suitably rewarding more efficient conduct, banks have caused major changes in behavior.
Manifestly, banks can also pay their ordinary customers to forego the float and use another system. Finally, there is some
reason to doubt that the same efficiencies will occur when such systems deal with large numbers of individual transactions.
There may also be some substantial costs which the study did not include which customers will have to bear.
84. See Miller, supra note 43; Miller, Interstate Branching and the Constitution, 41 Bus. LAw. 337 (1986);
Frieder, supra note 55.
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interstate mergers on small banks. 85 Other articles report on various state laws. 86
With few exceptions, there are no sustained investigations into the policy questions
of whether interstate banking is generally a good idea and what are the merits of
limiting interstate combinations when both banks are large. 87 One survey article did
present arguments on both sides, but did not critically examine those claims. 88
The positive argument in many of these articles is in reality a reverse negative:
there is no strong evidence of serious bad effects. Therefore, all combinations should
be allowed unless they would create provable negative effects. 89 The positive claims
are similar to those which have already been examined: better management, increased
efficiency, increased service, and deconcentration. These claims are no better
supported in the scholarly writing than in the congressional hearings or Board
decisions. 90
One claim worthy of more attention than it has received is that interstate mergers
allow large banks to acquire more stable deposit bases. 9' Such money center banks
today often "buy" deposits from smaller banks to support their lending. These
purchases often take the form of buying deposit claims for the overnight period
during which a bank must satisfy regulatory requirements as to loan to deposit ratios.
Such purchased deposits, as well as funds attracted by other kinds of price
competitive deposit solicitation, are quite price sensitive. Relying on such deposits
requires that a bank be an efficient and profitable lender. By acquiring ownership of
substantial banks with stable consumer deposits, the large banks can avoid some of
the price competition they would otherwise face. While this may be desirable from
the perspective of the specific bank, it is not in the long run interest of depositors or
efficient banking generally. Purchasing such nonprice competitive funds is a way to
avoid competition by acquiring a right to funds held at below market rates. The large
banks have simply captured a lower cost source and not improved the overall
efficiency of the banking system. In fact, they are merely exploiting the informational
and institutional failings of the present system. In any event, if changing the source
of deposits for large banks is socially desirable, the large banks can achieve this by
85. See, e.g., Rose & Savage, Interstate Banking and Viability of Small Independent Banks: Further Evidence on
Market Share Accumulation by New Banks, 32 ANrrmusr BuLL. 1007 (1987).
86. See, e.g., Given, Midwest Regional Interstate Banking, 17 Loy. U. Cat. L.J. 533 (1986).
87. The major exception is then Professor (now Judge) Ginsberg's lengthy article in which he argued for interstate
banking. Conspicuously, given Judge Ginsberg's Chicago credentials, he urged that combinations of large banks be
disfavored. Ginsberg, Interstate Banking, 9 HoFsmA L. REv. 1133 (1981).
88. Frieder, supra note 55; see also Cohen, Interstate Banking: Myth or Reality, 18 Loy. L.A.L. Ray. 965(1985).
89. See, e.g., Miller, Public Policy Implications of Legislation Limiting Growth of Interstate Banks, BAnK
CONFERENCE, supra note 6, at 602; Cohen, supra note 88 (Cohen specifically claims antitrust law will preclude too much
concentration).
90. Cohen, supra note 88; Freeman, Interstate Banking Restrictions Under the McFadden Act, 72 VA. L. REv.
1119 (1986). Both suggest that a multistate bank can have greater loan diversity. This reflects a serious ignorance of both
present and historic use of loan participations and loan sales as means of diversifying portfolios of banks. See Keehn,
supra note 63; see also Keehn, Federal Bank Policy, Bank Market Structure and Bank Performance: Wisconsin
1863-1914, 48 Bus. Hisr. REv. 1 (1974).
91. It is hard to find any author who expressly justifies mergers on this ground, perhaps because of its dubious
consumer welfare justification. Yet, empirical analysis of interstate combinations of large banks often point out that strong
consumer deposit bases, as well as relatively low commercial and industrial loan to asset ratios, are frequently features
of acquired banks. See Buynak & McElravey, infra note 155; Buynak, infra note 128; see also Phillis & Pavel, supra note
31.
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entering new markets and competing for such deposits rather than simply buying up
existing deposit bases. Such competition would tend to raise the price paid for such
funds to the market level.
The finance and economics literature is equally devoid of policy discussions
focused on the merits of interstate bank combinations. 92 This literature does
contribute greatly, as the next subpart will illustrate, to the belief that interstate
combinations create risks of negative economic effects. Yet no one has drawn the
strands together to see what they suggest about the public policy implications.
There is also a body of descriptive, predictive writing about interstate banking.
While this literature does not contribute direct insight into the public benefits of
interstate combinations, it does tell what the private benefits are. The fact that the
public and private benefits diverge and that private gains may exist even when no
public gains exist are helpful in explaining why such combinations will occur despite
their lack of public benefit.
D. An Explanation for the Lack of Public Benefits
This review of the claims for improved efficiency or other socially desirable
consequences resulting from large bank combinations shows that the common
assumption that increased size, especially as a result of merger, will improve
economic efficiency is false-at least in the case of banking. The discontinuity
between a popular as well as scholarly presumption of efficiency and the empirical
reality is very significant. If there are in fact few, if any, likely efficiency gains that
will result from such combinations, and if we assume bank managers are rational
economic actors, then there must be other nonefficiency explanations for large bank
combinations. Analysts of public policy toward business combinations must abandon
presumptions and look critically at the empirical data. When they do, they will
recognize that a promerger public policy toward banking can find no real justification
in the claim of economic efficiency.
The presumption of efficiency rests on the unexamined premise that large size,
especially achieved by merger, is qualitatively different from other ways in which
large groups of assets can be marshalled to respond to an economic need. This
assumption is untenable as a matter of theory. Markets, contracts of various kinds, as
well as ownership, are all substitutable means to organize and coordinate economic
activity. There is no theoretical reason to predict that one method will be more
efficient than another in the abstract. The particulars of the institutional and
technological realities will dictate the answer.
The lack of significant public benefits from a new type of merger is not suprising
given reasonable substitutability among the various methods of coordinating eco-
nomic activity. The only effect that bank ownership law ever had was to restrict
interstate ownership of banking facilities. The law never forbade the development of
interstate banking through joint ventures, cooperation, event specific contracts, and
92. But see Nelson, supra note 46.
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other nonownership means. To the extent that, as in credit cards, interstate
cooperation was useful, it has occurred. To the extent that, as in making very large
loans, a greater pool of assets was needed than the individual banks had, pooling on
an ad hoc basis has occurred. When specialized services required a greater volume of
business than an individual bank could produce, and customers demanded these
services, either a joint venture supplied the services or correspondent banks provided
them.
Since the last century, the United States has had an interstate banking system. 93
Until recently, the ownership of participating units was confined within state
boundaries or smaller areas. But that limit on ownership has not proven to be a
significant barrier to efficiency. 94 In fact, overall, the American system of dispersed
ownership has proven to be an efficient, progressive, and effective banking system.
Interstate ownership offers only a different form of integration across state lines.
Unless interstate ownership provides a more efficient alternative to the existing
means of integration, one should not expect that interstate ownership will provide any
advantages over the existing system of interstate bank organization. 95
Contracts and markets can be substitutes for interstate ownership, as the history
of American bank integration teaches. Yet, there is an unarticulated assumption that
ownership is always the most efficiently productive form of interstate integration.
Indeed, actual economic experience suggests that in the long term, there is little
difference between the present interstate integration system and interstate ownership.
Frequently, the less integrated form of economic coordination proves more efficient
over time. It would unduly expand this essay to develop the latter statement in any
rigorous way. 9 6 Suffice it to say here, because of the artificial limits on the
geographic scope of bank ownership, the legal regulatory and banking systems were
under sustained pressure to define, promote, and legally facilitate nonownership
solutions to problems of integration. Again, the experience of banking is strong
historical evidence that nonownership integration, properly nurtured, can achieve
efficiency comparable to, or better than, that of ownership integration.
If it is true that ownership is simply a formal, and not the only functional, means
of economic integration, it follows that a change in bank ownership rules will not
increase noticeably the overall efficiency and social utility of our banking system.
Consequently, the public interest argument for interstate bank ownership is remark-
ably weak. 97 Two policy concerns exist which might still create a positive
justification for interstate banking: an ideological commitment to limit regulation,
and the general social value of freedom of action. 98 But these values only justify
93. See Keehn, supra note 63; Keehn, supra note 89.
94. Cf. Nelson, supra note 46.
95. Cf. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONohuCA 386 (1938).
96. The core of the hypothesis is that methods of legal control are formal and not functional. Therefore, given time
and need (demand), the practical problems of efficient interrelationships can be resolved using any method of formal
control.
97. Cf. Nelson, supra note 46.
98. I have elaborated elsewhere on the role and relevance of such "tie-breakers" in determining public policy. See
Carstensen I, supra note 39, at 1104-05.
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allowing interstate banking as a general right to expand across state lines by opening
offices; neither value would require combining viable major banks in different states.
IV. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF LARGE BANK MERGERS
Proving that interstate combinations of large banks make no positive contribu-
tion to the public good in general does not prove that they have any negative effects.
It is possible, after all, that reorganization of ownership has no significance. If, in
fact, no serious negative risks existed, then the argument for allowing large bank
combinations would prevail as long as there is a preference for allowing freedom of
action for businesses. 99
The combination of large banks can, however, result in a number of negative
effects. This Part will list and discuss them. The risks are not limited to traditional
competitive concerns. In fact, perhaps the greatest risks are of possible increased
regulatory and efficiency costs. Moreover, there are a variety of nontraditional
competitive and market risks that interstate combinations also create.
A. Efficiency and Regulatory Risk Avoidance
Almost all the data on bank efficiency points to the conclusion that there are not
only no scale economies, but diseconomies will occur as banking organizations
grow.100 The probability of diseconomies also increases as banks become spread over
wider geographic areas. The costs of monitoring and supervising expand as layers of
supervising authority must be created. 10 The result is that large-scale interstate
branch systems are costly to operate. 0 2 The inefficiency of large banks indicates that
these banks will be less profitable and will use more of society's resources to achieve
the same output. Neither consequence serves consumer welfare or any other public
interest. 103
A likely consequence of the development of a system of inefficient banks is that
inefficient banks will pressure regulators for protection from more efficient compe-
tition. One can easily visualize renewed regulation to protect these giant dinosaur
banks from efficient competition for consumer loans, deposits, and business loans.
Therefore, in order to protect the established order, there will have to be further
dampening of efficient competition with resulting costs to consumer welfare.
Another potential outcome of the creation of large inefficient banks, particularly
in the context of deposit insurance and other protections, is that managers will
99. Cf. W. HuRsr, CONDrroNS OF FiREEost (1956); Miller, supra note 88.
100. See studies cited supra notes 6, 46.
101. One might claim that the increased monitoring costs are the internalization of costs which would otherwise
have appeared as expenses of bank regulation. Several considerations require the rejection of such a claim. First, internal
monitoring does not and cannot replace external supervision given deposit insurance and a general public concern with
bank safety and soundness. Second, as discussed below, the more dispersed a bank, the more difficult is any necessary
regulatory monitoring. Finally, bank examiners are both less costly than high priced vice presidents and have, because
of the nature of their relationship to the bank, better incentives to identify problems.
102. See First Interstate Says Big Layoffs Possible In Bid to Cut Costs, Vail St. J., July 3, 1988, at 15, col. 3. Cf.
Brownstein, supra note 46; Shull, supra note 54; Stevens, supra note 6.
103. See R. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977). Cf. R. BoRK, ANTrnRusT PARADox (1978).
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take high risks in the hope of receiving positive returns. Managers will have a
tendency to seek out and promote higher risk, larger loans.' 0 4 At best, this will add
to the regulatory costs because it will require increased external monitoring of
increasingly complex organizations. At worst, it will create a recurring pattern of
losses and crises in the banking system.
In ordinary business situations, inefficient firms would either fail or be taken
over by new managers, who would break them into smaller, more viable enterprises.
Neither of these checks exist in the banking system with respect to large banks.
Because of the perceived costs to the banking system as a whole from the failure
of the largest banks, bank regulators have declared that very large banks are
invulnerable to failure. 105 This protectionism has several consequences. It loosens
even further the market discipline that would otherwise force a bank to operate in
rational, efficient, and desirable ways. 106 Second, it creates an additional reason for
regulators to discourage effective competition which might threaten a tottering
enterprise. Third, it confers on shareholders of the largest banks an unearned increase
in share value. 107 This last consideration also creates a strong nonefficiency-based
reason for banks, not already in the protected category, to expand their size by major
acquisitions. Then they will also be protected and can reap the unearned increment in
share value. Finally, it is very costly to the public treasury.108
As a bank gets larger, it also becomes less vulnerable to takeover.' 09 Many
believe that the risk of takeover serves as an important control over inefficient
management. 10 To the extent that the risk of takeover induces less shirking and
discourages opportunistic behavior by managers, creation of very large banks can
eliminate or reduce this beneficial control. In takeovers in banking, the buyers are
substantially larger than their targets."' Barring combinations of major interstate
banks may not make them more vulnerable to hostile takeovers; but as smaller banks,
they are more easily pursued by other takeover techniques. Moreover, if a bar on
major combinations stimulates other forms of entry, the resulting increase in direct
104. This is at least part of the story behind the problems of the large Texas banks and the disaster of Continental
Illinois. See O'Driscall, Bank Failures: The Deposit Insurance Connection, 6 CorEM tp. PoL'Y Iss. 1 (1988). Cf. Hilder,
Thrift-Industry Crisis May Force an Overhaul of Deposit Insurance, wall St. J., July 27, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
105. Inquiry Into Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Fin. Inst. Super., Reg. and Ins. of the H6use Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 169-394
(1984); Carrington, U.S. Won't Let 11 Biggest Banks in Nation Fail, wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1984, at 2, col. 2.
106. See Baer & Brewer, Uninsured Deposits as a Source of Market Discipline: Some New Evidence, 10 EcoN.
PERSsp cr. (Sept.-Oct. 1986); Kaufman, infra note 113.
107. See Harris, Scott & Sinkey, The Wealth Effects of Regulation Intervention Surrounding the Bailout of
Continental Illinois, in BANK CONFR.ENtCE, supra note 6, at 104 (reporting that 11 largest banks had major stock price
increases and the next smaller banks had price declines following public disclosure of the bailout policy).
108. Estimates of recent bailouts run into the billions. See Apcar & Taylor, Texas Thrift Rescue to Cost U.S. $5.5
Billion, wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1988, at 3, col. 1; Apcar, First Republic Bank Bailout May Damage Capital Raising Efforts
of Other Banks, wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 3, col. 1. Cf. Hilder, Thrift Industry Crisis May Force Overhaul of Deposit
Insurance, wall St. J., July 27, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
109. Hostile takeovers of large banks are possible. The recent effort of Bank of New York to takeover Irving Trust
is illustrative. See The Bank of N.Y. Co., Inc., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 257 (1988). But the prolonged, costly, and highly
regulated fight illustrates how difficult such a project is.
110. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
HARv. L. REv. 1161 (1981).
111. See Phillis & Pavel, supra note 31, at 23.
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competition will provide a substitute for the threat of acquisition as a control over
management. 112
There are also supervision and insurance risks that result from large banks
making major loans over very wide areas. 113 It is obviously more difficult and costly
for a regulator to be sure that a bank's operation has been fully audited and evaluated.
Yet regulators must do this, particularly after having given banks the guarantee of
invulnerability from failure and liquidation. In addition, banks have shown a
distressing proclivity to make large amounts of loans to foreign governments of
dubious creditworthiness and large enterprises of similarly questionable character.
Additionally, the banks are unable to make good credit judgments when buying
loans.114 All of this is explicable as rational behavior by inefficient enterprises which
are taking excessive risks in order to secure reasonable earnings. Clearly, if the
present system of guaranteed survival is to continue, the degree of regulatory control
over lending decisions by major banks will have to increase. This is likely to be costly
in direct terms and in its stultifying effect on managerial initiative. 15
Finally, the Continental Illinois crisis and the crisis in Texas banking show that
when large banks get in trouble, it is very costly to bail them out.116 The very limited
capital in major banks means that the insurance system is not only the primary
investor, but also the involuntary investor of last resort in bailout cases. Therefore,
as more protected banks come into existence through large, interstate combinations,
the taxpayers generally will have to spend more to bail out the large banks which get
in trouble.
In sum, there will be efficiency and regulatory costs involved in allowing large
banks to come into existence. Because large banks do not pay these regulatory costs,
these expenses do not directly effect the decision of banks to consolidate. The direct
efficiency costs, on the other hand, should deter interstate combinations. The fact that
these efficiency costs do not deter large combinations is puzzling. In part, the answer
is, as the next two subparts will show, that large banks can achieve nonefficiency,
exploitative gains which may, in private economic terms, fully offset efficiency
costs. Secondly, as will be discussed in Part IV, other pressures may work to cause
individual bank managements to fail to make economically rational choices.
112. Lest the irony of suggesting that direct competition is a mere substitute for a more important, but indirect,
stimuli to efficiency escape attention, I note here that in any economically rational world, the order of priority would be
the reverse.
113. Kaufman, Banking Risk in Historical Perspective, in BANK CoNFERENcE, supra note 6, at 231, 237-42; cf. N.
STRuNK & F. CASE, WHERE DEREGUItATION ,E  WRONG: A LOOK AT THE CAUSES BEHIND SAVINGS AND LOAN FAILURES IN
THE 1980's (1988).
114. A major part of the problems of major banks including Bank of America, Continental Illinois, the large Texas
banks as a group, and even such traditional banks as Mellon, has been persistent bad lending decisions. See, e.g., Helyar,
Hard Charging NCNB Seizes a Large Share of Banking in Texas, Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 1, col. 6; Mitchell, supra
note 60; Thurow, America's Banks In Crisis, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23. 1984 (Magazine), at 48, col. 1.
115. Cf. A. MARTIN. ENTERPRISE DERIEo (1971) (study of the decline of American railroads attributing their fate to
the effects of regulation which, inter alia, focussed managers on regulatory-political issues rather than efficient railroad
operation).
116. See Apear, First Republic Bailout May Damage Capital-Raising Efforts by Other Banks, Wall St. J., Aug. 1,
1988, at 3, col. I (FDIC to put in $4 billion to bailout First Republic); Solomar, A Burst of Bailouts, NAT'L J. 2315 (Sept.
27, 1986) (Continental Illinois bailout alone cost over $600 million).
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Moreover, for reasons already indicated, the disciplines of failure and takeover do not
provide effective restraints on management decisions.
B. Competitive Costs as Traditionally Defined
Competition in banking has proven to be beneficial, as economic theory and
general experience had predicted. 117 There is debate, of course, as to how much of
a role competition policy has played in stimulating and promoting the growth and
development of banking, but no one disputes that competiton itself has played a key
role. Former Chairman Volcker and leading bankers endorse competition as vital to
the efficient and effective operation of our banking system.' 8 Therefore, if mergers
between large banks in different states cause a loss of competition, this creates
another potential social cost. This subpart will focus on the traditional competitive
risks posed by such combinations.
1. The Loss of Actual and Potential Competition
When two large banks combine, the result is a single bank where previously
there had been two viable banks. The merger eliminates the benefits that arise from
diversity and choice. 119 By definition, the individual banks were able to compete in
each other's territory through such alternatives as opening a nonbank office,
chartering a new bank, or acquiring a small or middle-sized bank. Despite the
expressed antipathy of large banks for such alternate means of entry, some major
banks have employed these routes. 120 Thus, the strategy being critiqued here is that
of combining a large bank with a dominant bank in a local market when the world of
interstate bank ownership permits many other entry means which are both legally
available and employed.
The key traditional measures of competitive loss are the reduction in actual and
potential competition in the affected markets. Large banks, especially those in the
multibillion dollar range, directly and indirectly compete in commercial lending
throughout much of the country. These large banks compete for loans by offering
loans directly to large borrowers and by buying loans from originating banks.' 2'
Hence, the combination of any two large banks reduces direct competition for loan
placement within the national loan market. Large banks can also compete, directly or
through correspondents, by providing a number of deposit services for large
117. See articles cited supra notes 6, 46.
118. See generally Bank Hearings, supra note 5.
119. Professor Loescher has emphasized the broader ways in which economically independent enterprises compete
as a basis for an even more general prohibition of major mergers. Loescher, Toward More Competitive Diversity in a
Market Concentrated Economy, in CORPORATIONS A DSocmrY 263 (W. Samuels & A. Miller eds. 1937). See also
Carstensen & Questal, The Use of Section S ofthe Federal Trade Commission Act to Attack Large Conglomerate Mergers,
63 CORNELL L. REv. 841 (1978); Dorsey, Free Enterprise vs. The Entrepreneur: Redefining the Entities Subject to the
Antitrust Laws, 125 U. PENN. L. Rev. 1244 (1977).
120. See Bank Hearings, supra note 5, at 310-11; for examples of entry, see cases cited supra note 53.
121. For examples of unsuccessful lending of both types see B. MARSH, CORPORATE RAGEDo: THE AGON OF
INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY 244-47 (1985); M. SINGER, FUNNY MONEY: THE WONDROUS TALE or PENN SQUARE
BANK (1985).
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customers. Leading banks in any area or region are the most likely to provide such
services as well. Therefore, the more geographically proximate the combining banks,
the more likely they are to be in substantial direct competition for large and medium
sized corporate business of all kinds. Rarely, however, has the Board reported or
analyzed the data on this aspect of competition.
The Board opinions approving interstate combinations do reveal that large banks
already often compete in each other's territory for consumer credit, mortgage
lending, and other primarily consumer-oriented banking business.' 22 In fact, through
credit cards and consumer finance affiliates, many major banks already offer a wide
range of consumer finance services in broad geographic areas. Hence, the combina-
tion of large banks is very likely to eliminate some actual as well as potential
competition in a wide range of consumer financial services.
One might argue, as the Board does, that the competitive losses resulting from
mergers among large banking organizations are minor. 123 Nevertheless, they are
losses. Moreover, bankers and the Board agree that competition is vital to
maintaining efficiency. Consequently, if competition is being sacrificed for no gain
to any other public interest objective, there is a net social loss, however minor.
The loss to competitive potential is even more certain. While the federal
government has never fared well in court in challenging bank mergers on potential
competition grounds, 124 the historic record is striking. More often than not, when
such mergers were blocked, at least one of the parties made entry into the other's
market within a reasonable time.125 Interstate banking opens the door to entry level
expansion into any market which offers promise of profit. The increased risk that
entry will occur if the existing banks in a market fail to provide high levels of service
and reasonable prices can be an important factor in making potentially oligopolistic
markets perform efficiently and competitively. The potential contestability of a
market can substitute for actual competition. 26 The more contestable a market is, the
more existing enterprises will have to behave in competitive ways.' 27 Indeed, this is
a primary argument advanced to justify interstate bank ownership. However,
interstate ownership can only achieve this competitive effect if the entry occurs by
foothold or de novo means.
Interestingly, proponents of interstate banking suggest that large interstate bank
mergers are a response to the increasing vigor of competition in many of their
122. See, e.g., Bane One Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 174, 176 (1988); Security Pacific Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull.
746, 747 (1987); Chemical N.Y. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 378, 379 n.5 (1987).
123. See, e.g., Security Pacific Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 74, 74 (1987).
124. United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
125. Halbrook & Savage, Interstate Commercial Banking: The Antitrust Issues, 98 BANKING L.J. 747, 762-63
(1981); Rhodes, The Impact of Bank Mergers and Laws on Statewide Banking Structure, 25 ANTrrmusT BULL. 377 (1980).
126. See W. BAUMOL, CON'ESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1983).
127. Interstate banking increases the number of potential entrants not subject to intermarket interdependency.
However, it is probable that large entrants will have some existing connections in the target market which may facilitate
entry and make them more effective competitors. This combination of factors should spur entry into economically
attractive local banking markets and should make such markets more contestable. These contestability considerations are
different from those suggested by Baumol, but rest on the same fundamental proposition that market behavior will vary
with the actual or perceived risks of effective entry. See W. BAUNOL, supra note 126.
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historically protected market areas. This competition has arisen without the benefit of
interstate bank ownership. Allowing interstate ownership thus may not perfect
competition, but permit the acquisition of potentially protected, dominant market
positions, deposit bases less subject to competition, or other marginal advantages for
established but not very efficient banks struggling to survive. 128 In sum, the objective
of major interstate bank consolidation is to make banking market positions less
contestable, not more contestable.
2. Linked Oligopoly
In an article published in 1970, Eleanor Solomon suggested that if firms have
positions in two or more geographically distinct oligopoly markets, the incentive to
compete vigorously in any one of these markets will be reduced or eliminated because
such competition will induce competitive counterattacks in the other markets in which
the same banks compete.129 Hence, when the same banking organizations participate
in several oligopolies, even if their shares in some are small, the links between
oligopolistic markets create a deterrent to vigorous competition.
Historically, the structure of American banking was consistent with the above
theory. The observed behavior of oligopoly banks suggested that they did respond to
each other in ways consistent with the theory. A relatively small set of money center
banks dealt with each other regularly on large loans and had a clear community of
interest which would lead to reciprocal restraint in their competition. 130 The growth
of regional banks has put a great deal of strain on this small set of banks. The
regionals are not bound to the group rules in the same way; regionals are less
interdependent within the context of interstate lending. 131 In short, they have fewer
links to the established national banking fraternity. On the other hand, regional banks
are often nurtured in a local or state market context in which legal. and other
institutional limits create similar local or statewide interdependency with respect to
more localized business. 132
The effect of combinations among banks from these two sets of oligopolies will
be to increase greatly the links among all specific oligopolistic markets. This effect
will reduce the incentives for more competitively oriented banking behavior in any
particular market. The enthusiasm of large regional banks for interstate bank
128. Buynak, Interstate Banking: Its Impact on Ohio Banks, ECON. CoMMENTARY (Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland,
Sept. 15, 1985); Phillis & Pavel, supra note 31, at 23.
129. Solomon, BankMergerPolicies and Problems: A Linkage Theory ofOligopoly, 2 J. MONEY C .Dnr & BANRtNo
323 (1970).
130. As long as each bank could trust the other not to compete, rates could be maintained in various submarkets.
As a matter of game theory, this is a type of "prisoner's dilemma" situation. Recent research has shown that stable,
anticompetitive, i.e., collusive, results can be achieved by using simple strategies. See R. AXELROD, THE EvOLtIoN OF
CooPEE AroN (1984).
131. A good illustration has come in the different responses of the two types of banks to the problems of foreign
debts gone bad. See, e.g., Guenther, Some Regional Banks Grow Rapidly, Reach Major-League Status, Wall St. J., Oct.
1, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
132. See Joint Appendix in United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602, app. at 1237-39, 1277-78 (1974)
(cited in part in Rhodes, supra note 125, at 379 n.10); see also B. MARSH, supra note 121, at 263-64; cf. In re Nat'l Tea
Co., 69 F.T.C. 226 (1966).
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combinations may simply reflect a desire to link oligopolies and recreate the less
turbulent context of the past.133
A similar problem will exist in more localized banking markets as leading
banking organizations become major participants in multiple states. The incentive
directly, or indirectly via correspondent relationships, to compete actively will
diminish because each banking organization will have an increasing concern to avoid
stimulating aggressive, retaliatory competition in the markets it dominates.
There is debate about the degree of competitive harm that linked oligopoly has
created. 134 Few claim that oligopoly linkages have any positive competitive
potential. 135 The only question is how harmful oligopoly linkages are to
competition. 136 Major interstate bank combinations will only increase the risks that
oligopoly linkages will reach the level of being measurably harmful to competition.
3. Entrenchment
In general, when a leading firm consolidates with another firm having
substantial resources, the resulting entity has both an existing position and a greater
ability to defend and protect that position. 137 The result is entrenchment of existing
positions. Such enhanced economic capacity deters both existing competitors and
potential new entrants from challenging the dominant firm, thereby reinforcing the
existing structure in these markets. 138 Interstate combinations among large banks
create entities with deeper pockets and with greater ability to occupy all available
branch locations, 139 engage in costly advertising, and cut loan rates selectively. 140
133. The patterns reported in Part I of this Article are consistent with such a long run objective. Bank support for
regional interstate banking and bans on the acquisition of new banks is also consistent with this theory. Cf. N. LAMssoux,
THE GREAT MERGER MoviEtN r AN tmucAN BusrNEss: 1890-1904 (1985) (the major merger wave in the 1890s was based
largely on a desire to reduce or eliminate emerging economic competition).
134. See Heggestad & Rhodes, Multi-Market Interdependence and Local Market Competition in Banking, 73 REv.
EcoN. STAT. 458 (1978); Master, The Effects of Multimarket Contact on Savings and Loan Behavior (Research Paper No.
85-13, Fed. Res. Bank of Philadelphia, 1985); Rhodes & Heggestad, Multimarket Interdependence and Performance in
Banking: Two Tests, 30 ANrmusr BuLL. 975 (1980); Whalen & Megel, Rival Stock Price Reactions to Large BHC
Acquisition Announcements: Evidence of Linked Oligopoly? (Working Paper No. 8605, Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland,
1986); Whitehead, An Empirical Test of the Linked Oligopoly Theory: An Analysis of Florida Holding Companies, in
Co.sNrwEcs oN BANK SL'ctr. AND CONIP. 119 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago, 1978).
135. Master and Whitehead report oligopolistic links had positive effects. But Whitehead was examining the very
unconcentrated Florida market. Whalen and Megel found that as the number of links increase, the effect of the additional
linkage decreased. Only Master's results are inconsistent with theory.
136. Rhodes and Heggestad suggest that the primary impact will occur after the merger movement has subsided.
This was the experience earlier in manufacturing. See N. LAtEROUX, supra note 133.
137. See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble, Inc. v. FTC, 386 U.S. 568 (1967); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936
(3d Cir. 1967), cert. den., 391 U.S. 919 (1968). There has been a resurgence of academic interest in, and discussion of,
these problems frequently employing the label "predation" rather than entrenchment. See Campbell, Predation and
Competition in Antitrust: The Case of Nonfungible Goods, 87 COLuM. L. REv. 1625 (1987); Krattenmaker & Salop,
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Salop &
Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. EcoN. REv. PAPERS AND PRoc. 267 (1983); Schmalensee, Entry Deference in
the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, 9 Bmt.L J. ECON. 305 (1978).
138. Cf. Storrs, The Case for a Rational Banking System, Co.'NENscE o.- BANK STr. AND Cosip. 35, 37 (Fed.
Res. Bank of Chicago, Apr. 23-25, 1984).
139. Industrial State Bank & Trust Co. v. Camp, 284 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Mich. 1968), vacatedas moot, 421 F.2d
1361 (6th Cir. 1969).
140. The power to make such short-term selected discretionary uses of resources is a function of size and diversity
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Of course, if a market is rapidly growing, entry and expansion may still occur;
but in less dynamic circumstances, the risk is that entry and expansion will not be
rational business conduct. The costs of success in such a slow growing market are not
worth the expected gain. Experience indicates that the result of such entrenchment
will be to reduce consumer welfare: prices will increase, the quantity and quality of
services will deteriorate, and innovation will no longer have the same attraction. 141
The logic of profit-seeking makes it very unlikely that a substantial bank will
enter, either de novo or on a foothold basis, into a stable market in which the leading
banks already have large partners. The costs and expected gains of competing in such
contexts must be compared with the gain expected from alternative uses of the
resources that might have been invested in such competition. Hence, the option of
buying a dominant position in another market makes it unlikely that a major bank will
undertake a more competitive alternative. In middle-size and smaller markets, only
a handful of large bank affiliates will exist. Local markets generally will be more
oligopolistic and less contestable. 142 The evidence that affiliates of large banking
organizations are no more effective as new entrants than are de novo banks and that
both types of entry are successful may suggest that the risks of entrenchment are less
substantial than they may appear. 143
4. Summary
This review shows that all the competitive risks traditionally examined in
evaluating mergers exist. Although none of those risks are overwhelming, all are
present.
C. Adverse Relational and Discretionary Power Effects
Traditional competitive policy analysis focuses on the price and output effects of
conduct in broadly defined markets. 144 One characteristic of such an analytic
perspective is that it ignores the more parochial and particular (relational) effects of
economic actors on each other. A second characteristic is that this analytic
perspective ignores much of the impact of discretionary power, i.e., choices having
economic effect on third parties but not involving market power. Large interstate
bank combinations can create negative social costs in both relational and discretion-
ary terms.
and not traditional profitability. Hence, the long run inefficiency of major banks is not relevant to their power to act in
such ways in specific markets.
141. Cf. D. RAVENSCROFT & F. SCHERER, MRGERS SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC EFFciENcY (1987); Weiss,
Concentration and Price-A Progress Report, in IssuEs AFrER A CE.NTURY OF FEDERAL COMPErMON Poucy 317 (R. Wills,
J. Caswell & J. Culbertson eds. 1987).
142. These effects are very much reinforced by present policies of allowing horizontal mergers.
143. See Rose & Savage, Interstate Banking and the Viability of Small, Independent Banks: Further Evidence on
Market Share Accumulation by New Banks, 32 ANTrrsusT BuLL. 1007 (1987).
144. See Carstensen, Antitrust Law and the Paradigm of Industrial Organization, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 487
(1983).
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1. Relational Power Problems
Relational power involves the ability of one economic actor to exercise power
over another as a result of the relationship between the parties. 145 Some relationships
are the result of location, e.g., the nearest convenience store, or other geographic
factors. Other relationships are of transactional or contractual origin. The relational
power of franchisers, automobile manufacturers, and gasoline producers arises from
their contractual power to control vital aspects of the next level of production or
distribution. Other relational power can arise from market imperfections that make it
difficult for the dependent party to take advantage of existing market opportunities.
Various elements of consumer credit illustrate this form of relational power. 146
If a business has relational power over some class of customers or other parties
with which it deals, it will be economically rational for the business to exploit that
advantage to the fullest extent in order to obtain higher prices or provide lower levels
of service to those specific parties. 47 It will also be a rational investment of the
business' resources to seek to enhance and perfect such exploitational capacity.
Conversely, maximizing the number of substitutes available minimizes the size of the
groups and the degree of feasible exploitation. 48 Increasing the number of differen-
tiated options increases the probability that specific parties will have reasonably good
second choices, making the parties more willing to resist exploitative actions. This
willingness to resist exploitative actions reduces the incentive to undertake the costly
process of locating and exploiting relational power. The theory expressed here
suggests that the number of independent choices will affect the degree of relational
power, but will never eliminate it.
Banks have a substantial capacity to create and exploit relational power. A loan
applicant in particular comes as a supplicant seeking funds. Would-be borrowers
must make large-scale disclosure of their business and possibly their personal
finances and must face the added costs of searching for additional credit sources if the
would-be borrower rejects the bank's offer. Moreover, once the bank has established
the credit line, customers find that they are now subject to the rights of the bank to
call the loan or enforce whatever other rights the bank may have under the loan
instrument.149 Unless the competitive market context impels the bank to behave
145. There is a large literature in contract law about relational contracting. For a good introduction in the terms of
competitive policy analysis, see Bohling, Franchise Terminations Under the Sherman Act: Populism and Relational
Power, 53 TLex. L. REv. 1180 (1975); see also Carstensen, supra note 144, at 502-03.
146. See, e.g., Cooter & Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments, 66 TEx. L. REv. 63 (1987).
147. See materials cited supra note 60.
14S. villiamson and Markovits both theorize that the degree of relational power is closely related to the cost of
switching to the next best alternative. See 0. WtLLIANsoN, MARKETS AND HIERARCHiES, ANALYSIS AND ANITrUST
IMPucvrtoNs: A SoD IN THE Ecoo.tics oF Ir NA. ORGANIZATON (1975); Markovits, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, The
Sherman Act and Economic Welfare, (pts 1-4), 26 STAN. L. REv. 493, 717 (1974), 27 STAN. L. Rev. 307 (1975), 28
STAN. L. REv. 45 (1975). The more alternatives that exist, the greater the likelihood that individual customers will have
one or more reasonably good next best alternatives. The more good alternatives that exist, the harder it is to set a cohesive
limit on competition.
149. The recent spate of successful lawsuits by borrowers shows the powerful nature of this relational power even
in today's banking world. For a critical discussion of the leading cases see Granoff, Emerging Theories of Lender
Liability: Flawed Applications of Old Concepts, 104 BANKING L.J. 492 (1987). See also Cappello, The Lender-Liability
Case, TRIAL 88 (Nov. 1987).
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reasonably, the bank's preference will be to allocate to itself powers to adjust the
relationship in ways that are in the bank's best interest, but are not necessarily in the
best interest of the other party or society in general.
Increased choice is, therefore, crucial to limiting the undesirable consequences
of relational power. Combinations of large banks reduce the number of alternative
credit sources, decreasing the chances of getting socially optimal systems for
governing the relationship between the bank and its customers. More generally, as
consumer choice decreases, the power of the bank in relation to its customers
increases.150 The incentives inherent in linked oligopoly reinforce these effects.
2. Discretionary Power
Discretionary power is the power of choice. Discretionary power exists in any
economic situation and is of concern when it has substantial impact on social or
economic aspects of society. As the number of decision-makers declines, the choices
of each remaining decision-maker take on greater significance. If 1000 firms make
locational decisions about factories, the nation need not be concerned. But if 10 or
even 100 firms decide where all the factories in the nation will locate, then the social
and economic impact of those choices will turn them into political decisions. Public
review of some sort will be inevitable. The problem is not one of traditional market
power abuse, but rather one in which the discretionary power of a few decision-
makers has a vast impact on the social and economic order. It also follows that some
classes of enterprise are more important than others because they have greater
external social and economic impact. Many such businesses are directly regulated as
to the scope and use of their discretion. t5 1 Other businesses remain unregulated
largely because their numbers are such that the case for controlling specific choices
is not powerful.
Banking is an industry whose discretionary choices on both the macro and micro
level have been the source of continuing social concern and regulation. It is manifest
that banking will never be free from regulation over its use of discretion.152 But
regulation can be a greater or lesser intrusion. As the number of banks exercising
economically important discretion decreases, the political pressure for more public
review of the use of their powers of choice increases. Therefore, the fewer the
number of major banks, the greater is the social concern with how each bank
exercises its discretion.
While a bank should presumably have substantial freedom to say whether or not
any particular loan is worthwhile, that freedom implies a discretion which creates
150. The emerging law of lender liability suggests an alternative and costly way to police the use of relational power.
Therefore, a likely consequence of the dramatic increases in the linkages among banks will be an increase in judicial
review of cases involving exploitation of relational power.
151. These limits include traditional health, safety, and consumer protection concerns. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 146.24 (West 1974) (regulation of milk quality); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 617.01-.23 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987) (regulation
of insurance).
152. See Loring & Brundy, supra note 8; Wynne & Spagnole, supra note 8. See also Financial Institutions
Symposium, 37 CArli. U.L. REv. 279 (1988).
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social concern. If most banks elect, for example, not to make loans on inner city real
estate, that decision creates strong pressures against the maintenance of a viable
center city. Similarly, if banks elect, in their individual discretion, not to make
certain types of business loans, then certain classes of business may not exist or will
suffer comparative disadvantages in finance. The greater the number of alternatives
open to prospective borrowers, the greater is the chance that any economically
rational business transaction will find financial support. The relatively closed
financial systems of Europe are a partial explanation of why European countries have
never had the kind of entrepreneurial activity that the United States enjoys. Such
entrepreneurship has also been a primary source of the United States' long run
economic success. 153 Thus, interstate combinations of large banks threaten both to
constrict the range of banks' discretionary choice and to create a political context in
which more public control over discretionary choice will exist. Both consequences
entail negative social costs.
Two other important aspects of discretionary power also deserve comment.
First, banks are important users of skilled professional services. In particular, banks
are important to the establishment and maintenance of major law and accounting
firms. As the discretion to select lawyers, accountants, and other similar professional
services moves upstream to a remote headquarters, leading local law, accounting, and
similar professions face a reduction in the demand for their services. As a
consequence, many localities will lose or have a reduced supply of the kind of highly
skilled and experienced business counselors that are an important part of their social,
economic, and political context. These individuals are an important part of the
infrastructure of a robust and dynamic local economy.
Second, banks and their top executives have historically played vital roles in
local social and political activity. Individual bankers make discretionary contributions
of their time to the betterment of their communities. Equally important, individual
bankers can command the financial resources of their bank to make contributions to
the community both by providing charitable donations and by supporting a wide
range of community development activities. If the bank ceases to be locally
controlled, managers will be less likely to exercise their discretion to expend time on
projects which bring local recognition yet lack support or recognition at corporate
headquarters. Similarly, direct contributions and other assistance will now rest upon
the discretion of corporate managers far removed from the locality, making such
assistance less likely to occur. Both of these losses will impoverish society as a
whole, even if they do not show up as a direct economic cost of allowing major bank
combinations.
To sum up, interstate bank combinations affect the problem of discretionary
power in two ways. First, interstate bank combinations reduce the number of
discretionary actors in the national framework and the potential number of discre-
tionary actors in local market contexts. The latter loss assumes that other means of
entry exist. With fewer players, the costs of any one player making poor discretionary
153, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963); cf. Dorsey, supra note 119.
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choices (poor from a social perspective) increase. Second, discretion must, in any
large organization, be subject to internal control. Internal control is both necessary as
a management device and vital to investor reliance on the business. 154 Internal control
inevitably shifts the ultimate discretion to the top managers. The top managers will
have their own agenda and values. The managers will shape the choices made and the
options accepted and rejected. The result is that states that lack major bank
headquarters will suffer losses relative to those states with major bank headquarters
based on the exercise of this discretionary power.155
3. The Regulatory Costs of Relational and Discretionary Power
Increased and increasingly visible relational and discretionary power create an
added economic hazard. The overall political history of the United States reflects
sustained hostility to significant and unregulated accumulations of such power.156 As
a result, conspicuous examples of relational power, such as franchise and dealership
agreements, are now subject to direct legal control.15 7 Similar controls exist over
consumer credit. 5 8 Discretionary bank power has been used to discriminate among
consumer credit applicants based on race or sex and to refuse credit for local
development. 5 9 This discrimination has already produced a complex of laws,
including the Community Reinvestment Act, which regulate the exercise of bank
discretion. ' 60 Such discrimination has also facilitated the development of an emerging
common law rule imposing liability on lenders for various kinds of misconduct.' 6'
It is questionable, however, whether such increased regulatory intervention and
control makes long run economic sense even if, as is often doubtful, it is sufficient
to provide any effective limits to the use of discretionary power. Any legalistic
control over the use of discretion is costly. Records must be retained and made
accessible. Large amounts of the manager's time may have to be devoted to the
claims process. All such costs ultimately become part of the cost of providing the
service. Beyond direct costs are the more subtle conduct responses such reviews may
produce. For example, rather than justify choices, managers may abandon an entire
field. Alternatively, all those seeking a particular type of service will be forced to pay
154. Cf. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (1982) (publicly held corporations
must have accounting controls).
155. For example, as of June 30, 1985, Ohio banks alone owned more than 17% of Indiana bank deposits. See
Buynak & McElravey, Ohio Banks: Hitting the Interstate Acquisition Road, EcoN. COMtENTARY (Fed. Res. Bank of
Cleveland, May 15, 1987). States such as Arizona, Delaware, Maine, Nevada, South Dakota, and Washington have a
majority of banking assets controlled by out of state organizations. See Erdevig, New Directions for Economic
Development-The Banking Industry, EcoN. PEaspECTivEs No. 12, at 17, 23, Table 4 (Fed. Res, Bank of Chicago,
Sept./Oct. 1988).
156. J. HuRsr, LAw AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1982).
157. See, e.g., Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 135 (West 1985 & Supp. 1986); Automobile
Dealer's Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1982); Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (1982).
158. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (forbidding discrimination in granting credit).
159. See Dedman, Banks Lending $20 Million in Low-Interest Mortgages, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, June 19,
1988, at 1, col. 1 (Atlanta banks respond to exposure of discriminatory lending practices by creating a limited loan
program).
160. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1982).
161. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
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higher prices for that service in order to cover the undifferentiated risks. 162 Finally,
such regulation is likely to rigidify the decision-maker's frame of reference and
thereby reduce the opportunity to develop innovative solutions to problems. 163
D. Aggregate Concentration
The final cost of large bank combinations that has both a political and a long run
economic aspect is the aggregate concentration of resources among fewer owners in
the financial sector of the economy.
In addition to the direct cost of regulating discretionary and relational power
already discussed, there is a broader negative political and ideological implication to
the combinations of large banks. The United States has sought to preserve and
maintain the ideal of an open society in which people and business have the
opportunity to achieve their ambition with as little state intervention as possible. As
the United States moves toward banking on a greater scale and, in consequence,
imposes more direct regulation over the use of the relational and discretionary power
of banking, that direct regulation will belie those claims to an open society in a very
overt way. A select few, subject to government regulation, will set bank policies that
will greatly affect financial conditions for entry and growth in all businesses. Indeed,
even if there were no real loss of opportunity, the appearance of a loss-the lack of
locally controlled lenders apparently willing to back new business-might precipitate
and reinforce a political climate unsympathetic to the needs of banking and business
generally. The risks run well beyond costly and stultifying regulation of banking
itself. Increased aggregate concentration can stimulate a renewed pressure for
wide-ranging, direct control of business decisions. 164 Because there are no significant
gains to economic efficiency with an increase in aggregate concentration, there is no
excuse for creating such political risks.
Two dynamic economic concerns arise from aggregate economic concentration.
The first concern is innovation internal to the banking organization. The larger an
institution, the more difficult the process of change and innovation. Large institu-
tions, especially geographically dispersed ones, must put more filters and controls on
innovation. It is a truism that large bureaucratic systems directly stifle innovative
development of new methods, systems, and products. Hence, large interstate banks
will have a hard time being consistently innovative.
Moreover, combinations of large banks directly reduce the number of substantial
entities able to initiate and respond innovatively to opportunities. As fewer manage-
ment committees control decisional power, the variance in experimentation is likely
to decline with a consequent delay or failure to discover lower cost systems or a truly
innovative product or service. The marginal experiment, which, for all we know, is
the most important one of all, will not occur.
162. Cf. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987).
163. See generally B. KLEN, DiNwamc Ecootrcs (1977).
164. This is a long standing question in American political-economic policy. For example, President Theodore
Roosevelt actively sought strong national control over large corporations as the necessary social limit on their use and
abuse of power. See M. SK.AR, THE CoReoPATE REcoNS-MUCTION OF ANMUcAN CAPITAUSm 1890-1916 (1988).
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As banking resources become more focused in a limited set of institutions, the
incentives to experiment over a broad range of options will decline. Large,
geographically dispersed banks will focus on the problems that such organizations
face. A solution that entails vertical or horizontal disintegration will be of no interest.
Thus, reducing the diversity of financial institutions circumscribes the range of
relevant innovations.
The second negative dynamic effect concerns society generally. A bank's
incentives to support new business and take risks is in part a function of its structural
security. Today, the very diversity of banks, their number and diffusion, insures that
banks neither control economic development nor manage it. Banks respond to
economic development and must find ways to serve their markets. As banking
organizations become larger, more uniform and bureaucratic, in entrenched positions
in static markets, tied to substantial existing clients, and lacking the pressure of actual
and potential competition, they will cease to serve the economic best interests of the
country as risk-taking lenders supporting new enterprise. They will, instead,
increasingly act to control, entrench, and protect an established economic order. This
is the role taken by German, English, French, and Japanese banks that reflects the
much more concentrated character of those national banking markets. 165
E. Conclusion
This survey of the potential costs associated with the mergers of large banks
suggests two important points. First, there are many potential social costs to such
combinations. They include: traditional and nontraditional competitive concerns,
increased regulatory burdens, and the efficiency cost of such combinations both in
operating and dynamic terms. Second, these costs are cumulative. The presence of
some types of costs will tend to cause other types of costs to emerge. Thus, even if
no one cost appears overwhelmingly likely, or likely to be of great substance, the
cumulative and interactive character of such costs means that their total effect will
probably be greater than the sum of the specific impacts.
V. THE CHANCES OF LARGE MERGERS INVOLVING SOCIAL COSTS
If the foregoing analysis of negative effects is correct, why should we expect
large bank combinations to continue to occur? Large bank combinations are unlikely
to deliver on their promises of good things and are likely to involve inefficiency.
Indeed, because some benefits are possible, can we predict that banks will act in a
selective way so that only desirable mergers will occur? The simple answer is no. On
an empirical basis, it seems very clear that the present trend will continue. This trend
may reflect managerial or firm rivalry, or defensive strategy. 166 In any event, all
indications are that such combinations will continue to occur on a substantial scale.
165. See Roth, German Banks Maintain Corporate Grip, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1987, at 32, col. 4.
166. Large banks, seeing their own markets invaded, may react by creating defensive alliances to respond to the
perceived threat despite efficiency costs. See Staff, Davidson & McDonald, supra note 79; cf. Phillis & Pavel, supra note
31; Schlesinger, GM Seeks to Buy A Sizable National Car Rental Stake, Wall St. J., Aug. 8, 1988, at 4, col. 5.
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This is less surprising if one recognizes that the private interest of banks and
their managers is not necessarily congruent with the public interest. Public costs are
often private gains. Hence, the private balance can be quite different from the public
balance. Many contemporary economic thinkers deny or minimize this divergence.
They assume that enterprises have as their only or primary objective improved
allocative and productive economic efficiency.167 Because such an objective is indeed
consistent with social objectives, it is easy, given such an assumption, to conclude
that only good mergers will occur.
But, in theory and in fact, business seeks profit and not efficiency. Therefore,
decreased efficiency in production is not a deterrent to a course of conduct if it also
creates sufficient disincentives for others to compete or blocks enough entry of new
competition to make the long run balance of gain and loss favor the conduct. 168
Hence, so long as the expected private gains to corporate actors outweigh their
expected costs, there is no economic deterrent to such a private course of conduct.
Therefore, a combination having no positive, and possibly a negative, efficiency
effect can still be valuable if it allows one or both parties to exploit any relational
power over their customers more effectively. Even worse, merger may eliminate
actual or potential competition, create or strengthen intermarket oligopolistic links,
and entrench further oligopolistic power over classes of customers. Merger of leading
banks is the most likely way in which all of these anticompetitive and socially
undesirable effects will occur. 169 The premiums paid in such mergers may well
reflect, at least in part, the value of such expected future market control.170
There is an additional consideration that makes mergers possible despite their
inefficiency. Shareholders in publicly traded banks are not able to police managers
closely, and they cannot capture the full value of the enterprise as a going concern.
Because a buyer of the enterprise acquires full control over it, the buyer will be able
to extract all surplus value that the enterprise produces. Consequently, the buyer bank
can afford to pay a premium over the market price of stock in the acquired bank
because it will acquire the ability to capture the full value produced. This is the best
explanation for the phenomenon of the "control premium" that is frequently
observed in various types of corporate takeovers. Unlike explanations of takeover as
evidence of the buyer's recognition of more efficient uses for the acquired assets,' 7 '
this explanation relies on the weak monitoring power of dispersed shareholders and
explains observed premiums accordingly.172 This is an especially powerful explana-
tion in the banking context because the many restrictions on changes in bank
167. See R. BOR, ANTrrrmusT PAP Aox (1978); R. POSNER, AgrreRusT LAW AND ECONOMICS (1976); Easterbrook, The
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TLE. L. REV. 1 (1984).
168. There is a very important recent literature developing this proposition. See supra note 137.
169. These effects may be the cumulative result of a set of mergers that will make it even harder to detect such
consequences in any particular case.
170. See Phillis & Pavel, supra note 31.
171. This is the usual assumption that is uncritically adopted in analyses of takeovers. See, e.g., Babchuk, Toward
Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1693, 1700-03 (1985).
172. Cf. Coffee, Shareholders Verses Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MicH. L. REv. 1 (1986);
Lowerstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 CoLust. L. REv. 249 (1983).
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ownership make it hard for the market for corporate control to discipline management
on a continuing basis. 173 Hence, even if there are efficiency costs to managing banks
in several different states or regions, the buying bank can pay a premium over the
market because, despite such costly monitoring, the buying bank will receive a higher
yield as owner than existing shareholders.
VI. A COsT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF LARGE BAK MERGERS
Banks are the creations of positive law and policy. Any system of money and
credit is a construction of the legal system and would disintegrate without legal
definition and enforcement. 174 When banks or other financial institutions exist,
expand, merge, or dissolve, it is because the legal system authorizes that outcome.
There is no "natural right" of banks to have some particular shape, character, or
scope. A bank is what the law says it is. This point is important because it means that
a decision either to expand or contract bank rights must rest on policy and not some
abstraction of inherent rights.
A cost-benefit analysis is a basic policy tool that helps collect and weigh
competing considerations. The basic test of such an analysis is whether the gains are
worth the costs. While there are obvious and probably insuperable problems with
rigorously establishing the values on either side of this kind of an equation, some
general, probabilistic statements are possible. Moreover, express analysis of the
cost-benefit balance, even if uncertain, sharpens the policy focus.
On the benefits side, the striking fact revealed above is that gains from large
interstate combinations are unlikely to occur, unlikely to be truly public, i.e., not
otherwise achievable benefits, and unlikely to be substantial even if they do occur. 175
The few, easily identifiable, exceptions prove the strength of the generalization. The
bulk of the positive arguments rests upon either unanalyzed ideas of inherent right and
logical necessity, or upon a misapplication of valid claims, particularly the impor-
tance of competition.
On the negative side, interstate combinations of large banks are reasonably
certain to create some costs. Most of the potential negative costs are the logical
outcomes of the resulting structural changes that these combinations will produce.
However, it is unlikely that the direct and identifiable elements of these costs will be
very substantial. Despite the long list of risks set forth and described above, empirical
studies rarely find substantial observed costs associated with such risks in the existing
banking environment. However, some risks such as that of excessive inefficiency
could create major costs in the future.
On balance, the benefits are slight at best and unlikely while the costs are much
more likely but also probably slight.
173. See Heifer & Bruemmer, Federal Banking Law Considerations in Unfriendly Takeovers of Depository
Institutions, 33 Aml. U.L. REv. 309 (1984).
174. This is not to claim that law always controls the actual conduct of the business. See J. Huitr, A LEaA. HiSTy
OF MONEY IN -ME UNrrED STATEs, 1774-1970 (1973).
175. See Staff, Davidson & McDonald, supra note 79; cf. Miller, supra note 89.
1430 [Vol. 49:1397
1989] INTERSTATE BANK MERGERS: THE CASE FOR CONCERN
Given such a general balance, those reviewing a particular bank combination
could justify an initial presumption that the combination is objectionable. It would
then be possible to rebut the initial presumption by making a specific showing that a
modestly demanding test revealed that public benefits are reasonably likely. So long
as the presumption is rebuttable, no merger which is reasonably likely to have
positive effects would be blocked. However, an assessment of the claims of public
benefit made in past large combinations, and the lack of either specific or general
empirical support for those claims, would suggest that most proposed combinations
could not overcome the initial presumption. 176
If, despite the balance struck here, decision-makers started with the opposite
presumption, then almost all combinations would be accepted. Such a presumption of
acceptability of the merger would be rebuttable as to any particular transaction.
However, it is unlikely that the evidence as to most bank combination proposals
would show the existence of potential negative effects at any level of substantiality
even if it is conceded that such effects may occur. 177 The central implication of this
analysis is that approval or disapproval of the bank combination, in most cases, will
depend upon the initial presumption of the decision-maker and not upon the merits of
the particular case. Therefore, the choice of initial presumption is crucial.
There is a traditionally strong basis for a presumption that allows any bank
combination to which the parties have consented. Notions of economic and enterprise
freedom are at the core of such a presumption. The abstract right of freedom of action
is often justified on the pragmatic grounds that bank combinations are necessary for
the essential growth of banking enterprises and for the achievement of social
advantages. Such pragmatic claims are questionable in light of the information
presented above. The general value of avoiding unnecessary interference with the
decisions of business also exists. Any interference imposes regulatory costs and
denies to the economy whatever serendipitous benefits may arise.
On the other hand, given the legalistic nature of banking and the fact that merger
review will have to occur in any event, the regulatory cost savings resulting from
electing one presumption over the other is marginal at best. Similarly, the claim of
freedom to alter the geographic scope and scale of a banking enterprise by
combination flies in the face of the general social policy and legal reality that positive
legal authority is necessary to define what a bank may be and do. Freedom of action
is accorded only when it has demonstrable instrumental value. Hence, the arguments
for a presumption of nonintervention are not strong.
In contrast, three types of arguments favor a presumption against large
combinations. First, there is a statutory argument. Congress has required, in all bank
merger legislation, that there be positive benefits to justify the combination. ' 78 This
176. For an analysis of typical claims made in such large bank combinations, see Carstensen II, supra note 65, at
582-88. See also Allardice, supra note 71 (reporting very limited actual implementation of proposed new activities).
177. Those defending unconstrained interstate bank combinations rely heavily on this type of analysis and argument.
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 88; Miller, supra note 43.
178. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1982).
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consistent requirement suggests an underlying policy or value choice that rejects
unconstrained freedom of action for banks. 179
A second consideration is the combination process itself. In the usual situation,
a bank combination is a nonadversarial, largely ex parte proceeding in which the
banks are the only parties actively collecting and presenting information. Such
information is subject to potentially extensive staff review and even outside
comment. Yet, the process would require a radical and costly change if agency staff
or third parties were to litigate issues regularly. Hence, putting the burden on the
merging banks to identify the potential gains and offer convincing evidence that such
gains will occur will facilitate critical review of the merits of proposals. The
knowledge that such a requirement exists will allow private parties to determine
directly whether it makes sense to proceed. In effect, private parties can internalize
the public interest concerns into their business expansion plans. Such internalizing
should limit the overall direct regulatory costs.
Finally, in any decision of this sort, a key question concerns the fundamental
policy goals that should be sought. There are no scientific or logical solutions to the
choice problem. It is a matter of values.180 There are three values which point toward
the choice of a presumption against such combinations.
First, a presumption against interstate combinations of large banks is not a major
intrusion on the choices of existing banking organizations. These organizations would
have the right to expand into other states and to do so by acquisition. Only major
acquisitions by major entities would be foreclosed.
Second, and closely related, the means of entry permitted will most likely
stimulate the most positive contribution of interstate banking: increased competition.
Hence, the limitation will reinforce the public advantages that such expanded powers
make possible.
Third, a long run economic dynamic consideration follows closely from the
expectation that expansion will occur despite the presumption against bank combi-
nations. More actual and potential participants in the market are always preferable to
fewer. More actors means a greater variety of decision-makers and more opportunity
for experiment and innovation. 181 Indeed, given its strong reliance on the competitive
market, public policy should never needlessly sacrifice a viable competitor.
In addition, there is the social and political philosophy of democracy, particu-
larly American democracy, which holds that unnecessary size is undesirable.18 2 This
value also points toward a requirement that those proposing large-scale combinations
179. For example, interlocking directorships among large banks not owned in common are forbidden regardless of
how directly they compete. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3207 (1982). See Carstensen II, supra note 65, at 592-94. Cf. Holland,
$500 Million Limitation BHC Acquisitions?, 97 BANKING L.J. 884 (1980).
180. For a useful analysis of the role of values in legal scholarship and policy analysis, see Rubin, The Practice and
Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MiCH. L. REv. 1835 (1988).
181. This is the model of the perfectly competitive market. While no one expects banking to become perfectly
competitive, anything that moves its structure in that direction should be positive. See Dorsey, supra note 119; Loescher,
supra note 119; cf. W. BALDWIN, AuTrrmusT AND THE CHANGING CORPORAToN (1961).
182. See J. HunsT, supra note 156.
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establish that such combinations are reasonably necessary to achieve real and
otherwise unachievable social values.
The values justifying a negative presumption limiting large bank combinations
are more persuasive in this context than the counter considerations. The key objection
to interstate combinations of major banks remains the total lack of any convincing,
general advantage to the economy resulting from such combinations. Conceding that
the case for serious economic risks is not powerful, this argument still has more
substance and more adequately explains when and why interstate combinations of
large banks occur despite their neutral or negative efficiency than do any or all of the
social advantage arguments. On balance, interstate combinations of large banks are
socially undesirable and should be at least presumptively unlawful. 83
VII. LEGAL ALTERNATIVES TO CONTROL LARGE COMBINATIONS
Assuming a policy decision that large interstate mergers should be presump-
tively objectionable, the next question is how to implement such a policy. There are
four ways in which this could be done. Two would involve new legislation, while the
remaining two would involve reactivating existing legal controls which have fallen
into disuse.
A. New Legislation
First, Congress could adopt limits on permissible bank mergers. The 1985
House Banking Committee Bill is one example. 184 The bill would have barred
combinations among the twenty-five largest banking organizations and would have
barred major acquisitions by any organization with more than one percent of all bank
deposits in the country. On the basis of the analysis presented in this Article, such
prohibitions could be further extended to create a presumption against the acquisition
of any bank with more than one billion dollars in assets by any other banking
organization having more than four or five billion dollars in assets. Alternatively,
combinations between banks having more than five percent of the total deposits in
any state could be forbidden. ' 85
There is an advantage to a simple command; it precludes a great deal of costly
effort to avoid its terms. The very simplicity of such legislation creates a counter-
vailing problem: fitting the command to the relevant facts. Banking structure in the
183. Three distinguished and experienced banking economists have supported a similar position. Halbrook &
Savage, Interstate Commercial Banking: The Antitrust Issues, 98 BANsK=s L.J. 747 (1981); Shull, Interstate Banking and
Antitrust Laws: History of Public Policies to Promote Banking Competition, 6 Co~rm.mp. POL'Y IssuEs 24 (1988). In
addition, when he was a law professor, Judge Ginsberg, who has also served as Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust
in the Reagan administration, endorsed an analogous policy toward major bank combinations. Ginsberg, supra note 87,
at 1341-55.
184. H.R. REP. No. 2707, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); see also Depository Institutions Acquisition Act of 1985,
H.R. REP. No. 99-174, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
185. These limits are closer to, but not as low as, those used to bar interlocking directors. See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3201-3207 (1982). Shull suggests that regulatory barriers to new entry (chartering) should be reduced and that large
bank combinations generally be forbidden. See Shull, supra note 183; Halbrook and Savage similarly recommend a ban
on mergers. See Halbrook & Savage, supra note 183. Ginsberg supports a similar policy. SeeGinsberg, supra note 183,
at 1355-57.
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United States is very diverse. A four or five billion dollar bank may be neither large
nor powerful in California or New York, but may well be both in Colorado or
Wisconsin. Thus, there are problems with the use of an asset size criterion. There is
also a problem in adjusting the size limit to take account of inflation. Nevertheless,
such a limit would leave open most expansion options by precluding only one type
of acquisition.
State share measures are perhaps better criteria. But even they can fail to
distinguish between a situation in which a six percent bank is also the largest bank in
the state and a situation in which a six percent bank ranks lower in the state but its
overall structure is more concentrated. Moreover, there is the highly difficult problem
of which deposits to include. In some states, savings institutions and credit unions are
very effective competitors. In other states (and for particular classes of business),
savings institutions and credit unions are not very important alternatives.186
Finally, congressional limits on permissible bank mergers would also have to
permit reasonable regulatory discretion to approve the infrequent, but socially
valuable combination. Otherwise, congressional limits would be unduly restrictive in
terms of the policy arguments made above.
The second legislative alternative exists at the state level. In authorizing
interstate bank ownership, the states can (and several have) restrict who may engage
in interstate bank ownership or otherwise reasonably condition participation.187 For
example, nonresident banking organizations above a specific size limit could enter
the state only by de novo means or by acquisition of banking resources below a
specific threshold.
There are potential constitutional and implementational problems with state
statutes. 188 These laws may not bind all banks as to all types of subsequent
acquisitions, especially if the resulting bank has a national charter. 189 Crucial to this
question is the scope of state branching law and bank holding company controls.
When New York regulated bank expansion within the state, New York required that
all interdistrict combinations take the holding company form. 190 Under national
holding company law, the states have joint plenary power to review all such proposed
186. See Kintner & Bauer, Competition at the Teller's Window?: Altered Antitrust Standards for Banks and Other
Financial Institutions, 35 U. KAN. L. REv. 657, 669-73 (1987).
187. A recent study of state laws identified six states with various limits on acquisitions all based on deposit shares:
Indiana-12%, Iowa-8%, New Jersey-13.5%, Ohio-20%, Texas-25%, W. Vir.-20%. See R. JoNs & B. Puts,
supra note 1.
188. On the constitutional issues compare Independent Commun. Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Gov. of the Fed. Res.
Sys., 838 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1988) with Independent Commun. Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Gov. of the Fed. Res. Sys.,
820 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
189. National banks are largely immune from state regulation. Hence, a nonresident banking organization can enter
a state by acquiring a bank, convert it to national charter, and then merge other banks into that bank largely free from state
control. See, e.g., Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970); Volunteer State
Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 684 F. Supp. 964 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
190. Until 1976 the State of New York was divided into banking districts. Banks could branch within a district, but
only holding companies could own banks in different districts. Because national banks' right to branch is subject only to
the comptroller's review, 12 U.S.C. § 36, New York acquired plenary review power by forcing those interdistrict
combinations that it wanted to review into the holding company form. See N.Y. BaKINo CooE § 105 (McKinney 1971
& Supp. 1988).
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combinations. 191 Hence, even if a national charter were involved, the state banking
authority retains a right to review in order to insure that no unacceptable combinations
would occur. To implement fully such controls at the state level would require that
the state establish comparable limits on intrastate combinations. The state could then
enforce those limits as to acquisitions by all holding companies. However, national
banks in such a state which were not part of a holding company still might escape
state control as to mergers or branching. 92 This lack of state control over nonholding
company banks would restrict the effectiveness of any state effort to limit concen-
tration. Given the trends toward use of the holding company device, however, it is
unclear how many banks would escape regulation. Nevertheless, state legislative
control would inevitably have some limitations.
B. Existing Controls
Perhaps the best alternative to new legislation would be to revive the "conve-
nience and needs" criterion of the Bank Holding Company Act. 93 Because most
interstate bank combinations involve holding companies, the Board has exclusive
review power at the national bank regulatory level. Technically, interstate combina-
tions by large banks must already satisfy the convenience and needs criterion.
However, the meaning of that standard has been misunderstood and misapplied.' 94
Properly understood, the convenience and needs criterion makes preservation of
competition an important factor and requires employing the least anticompetitive
alternative to achieve any socially desirable banking objective. Thus understood, the
convenience and needs criterion itself creates a presumption against bank combina-
tions which have any potential negative effects unless the specific combination also
has offsetting positive effects.
Based on the analysis of large bank combinations offered above, the consistent
and rigorous use of that approach to convenience and needs would impel the Board
to reject most proposed combinations and to permit them only in special circum-
stances. Such a standard must, unlike past practice, be consistently employed. '95
Despite the way in which the Board has interpreted the convenience and needs
criterion in the past, this criterion is not discretionary, but rather has a single clear
command that must be uniformly applied in all cases.
The final existing means to control bank combinations would be through revival
191. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1982); but see the decisions on South Dakota banking law, supra note 188.
192. It is clear that the comptroller alone implements any applicable state limits. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982). While it
is generally assumed that absent specific national law authorizing combinations or branches not permitted by state law
(see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 81 (1982), permitting relocation of headquarters), § 36 would limit branching rights and so
indirectly limit combinations resulting in branches where the assets of the resulting bank exceeded the state limit. Cf.
Carstensen I, supra note 39, at 1118-25.
193. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
194. Carstensen II, supra note 65; see also Carstensen 1, supra note 39. Halbrook and Savage suggest revising the
convenience and needs criterion to make more express the negative presumption against large bank combinations.
Halbrook & Savage, supra note 183.
195. The Board and the FDIC have in the past occasionally employed the convenience and needs or competitive
effects criterion in this way. Neither agency, however, has adopted such an approach on a consistent and general basis.
See Carstensen II, supra note 65.
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of the antitrust laws: Section 7 of the Clayton Act' 96 or Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.197 The Clayton Act's prohibition of mergers, which "may substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly,"' 198 would, given generous judicial
interpretation, justify a court in forbidding those interstate mergers among large
banks which lacked specific justification. Such a construction would, however,
require either that the courts take a less structural view of some of the competitive
issues in merger analysis, or introduce a more express balancing test in which the
risks, however minor, to competition are balanced against the expected gains to
efficiency or other social values. 199 When gains are unlikely, then even minor losses
to competition may be "substantial" because of the lack of a plausible offsetting
gain.
Perhaps a better route for the antitrust analysis is through the prohibitions on
restraints of trade articulated in Section 1 of the Sherman Act. This section says that
"combinations, in the form of trust or otherwise" in restraint of trade are illegal. 200
A bank holding company acquisition is such a combination.
The legal standards for applying the Sherman Act balance any elimination of
competition against any efficiency gain. Moreover, the statutory history and language
make clear that Congress preferred competition. Hence, the presumption is that a
combination restraining trade is illegal unless it can overcome that presumption.2 01
Because large bank combinations, by definition, eliminate all actual and potential
competition among the parties, such combinations restrain trade to some degree.
Moreover, such restraints will have some negative effect, however minor, on the
overall competitive context and are unlikely to have positive effects. As a result, the
Sherman Act analysis would hold bank combinations illegal except when there is
reasonable probability of a demonstrable and otherwise unachievable positive effect
in a particular case.
This analysis has already received judicial approval in the context of large bank
combinations in which the Clayton Act's criteria were not directly violated. The
leading case involves the merger which produced Manufacturers Hanover Trust. 202
Congress voided the court's finding of illegality in Hanover Trust by grandfathering
all consummated mergers. 203 Yet the Bank Merger Act that achieved this result
196. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
197. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
198. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
199. See Halbrook & Savage, supra note 183, at 763.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
201. Section I of the Sherman Act states that "every" combination in restraint of trade is illegal. 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982). The rule of reason has modified this standard. See Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The logic
of statutory construction would seem to imply that Congress has clearly made competition the prior policy goal. See
United States v. Trenton Potteries, 226 U.S. 597 (1923); see also National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v.
Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1981), Denver & R.G.W. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485,498 (1967); cf. Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 133.01 (West 1974) (declaring competition is preferred state policy). But see Arthur, Farewell to the Sea ofDoubt:
Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REv. 266 (1986) (suggesting a different balance).
202. United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
203. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1982).
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may also be interpreted as adopting the Sherman Act standards laid down in Hanover
Trust for future bank combinations. 2 °4
C. Summary
This Part provides only a brief summary of the available means for implement-
ing a policy of prohibiting large interstate bank combinations. Each option entails
many particular problems of articulating the appropriate rules and of defining
effective means of implementation, including the problem of determining how
exceptional cases would be defined and proven. It is worthwhile to pursue those
technical issues only if the policy judgment is first made that such combinations
should be restricted.
VIII. CONCLUSION
One should not be optimistic that policy makers will think critically about
controlling the nature of interstate bank combinations. Too many policy makers
believe in the superiority of the large firm despite being surrounded in banking,
retailing, manufacturing, academia, and government by realities that contradict such
mythology. If the policy makers are wrong about the inherent efficiency of such
banks, and the evidence points that way, then they are building a banking system that
will eventually require either protection from substitutes, new entrants, and others
who might threaten its fragile hold on economic survival, or a massive, government
financed restructuring. In a couple of decades, one can expect to hear bankers telling
Congress about the need to protect our banking system from competition in the same
way as the overly concentrated, inefficient steel and auto industries are now doing.
When we hear those calls for help we will know that the wrong policy choices were
made, but by then, it will be too late.
204. See Carstensen H, supra note 65, at 590.
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